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Most of our perceptual experiences consist of concurrent and multiple sensations in different sensory modalities. Despite this fact, we do not perceive a collection of singular sensations. Instead, we perceive a world of multimodally unified objects and events. For example, when we watch a bouncing a ball, we do not perceive the bali's separate visible and audible attributes; rather, we perceive a moving object that has a certain rhythmic quality to it. Likewise, when we interact with another person our perceptual experience is that of a talking person rather than that of a separate voice and face that happen to occur together in space and time.
Undoubtedly, the ability to perceive the integral nature of multimodally specified objects and events has evolved because it is highly adaptive. An organism that can perceive objects and events in an intermodally integrated fashion is at an adaptive advantage because such integration reduces the overall amount of information that has to be processed to more manageable proportions and makes processing more efficient and rapid. Indeed, it is interesting to note that evolution has capitalized on this advantage by incorporating intersensory interactions into the neural architecture of most species. This fact was noted by Stein & Meredith (1990) , who observed that they knew of no organism with a nervous system in which the sensory modalities maintain absolute exclusivity from one another. In other words, intersensory interaction is a basic neural design feature that is found at most phyletic levels. One impressive example of the advantage that intersensory interaction confers on an organism is the male gypsy moth, which is able to find a female at distances of 1-2 miles. He is able to do so This work was supported in part by funds from the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities and in part by National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Grants R03 HD36731 and R01 HD35849.
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because he constantly integrates information about his position in space vis-h-vis the olfactory gradient created by the female, the wind speed gathered by his tactile and proprioceptive senses, and his position in space determined from visual cues (Stein & Meredith, 1993) . Obviously, the male moth would have a much harder time finding the female on the basis of smell alone. At the human level, a good example that illustrates the advantage of intersensory interaction can be found in speech perception. Under normal conditions, our perception of a talking person is dependent on the synchrony between the audible and visible aspects of the speech produced by that person. This is evident by a decrease in identification accuracy when the synchrony between the audible and visible aspects of the person's speech is disrupted (Dodd, 1977) . Similarly, identification of a speech signal on the basis of its audible features is considerably less accurate than when the visible features of that signal are added (Summerfield, 1979) . Marks (1978) has argued that underlying the ability to integrate information across different modalities is the fundamental process that enables us to perceive similarity. In other words, whenever we integrate information across different modalities we perceive similar qualities regardless of which sensory modality registered the information. For example, when a person can be seen and heard uttering a word, the visible and audible duration of the word is the same. Likewise, when we touch and look at an object, we perceive the same shape, spatial extent, and texture in each modality. In general, any attribute that can specify similar information across modalities is considered to be amodal in nature. Intensity, spatial location, rate, and rhythmic structure are other common types of amodal attributes. The similarity specified by amodal attributes has been variously referred to as intermodal invariance (J. J. Gibson, 1966) , common sensibles (Marks, 1978) , or intersensory equivalence (Lewkowicz, 1994a) .
Although the perception of intersensory equivalence is the best known and most important way in which integration of information across modalities can occur, other forms of intersensory integration such as facilitation, inhibition, or association are possible as well. This suggests that intersensory integration is not a unitary process and that distinct mechanisms might be involved depending on the specific type of intersensory interaction (Lewkowicz & Turkewitz, 1980; Ryan, 1940; Turkewitz, 1994; Turkewitz & Mellon, 1989; Walker-Andrews, 1994) . For example, facilitation occurs when stimulation in one modality produces greater responsiveness to (usually concurrent) stimulation in another modality and does not involve the detection of similarity. Thus, adults' judgments of visual intensity can be markedly enhanced by the concurrent presentation of an auditory stimulus (Stein, London, Wilkinson, & Price, 1996) , adults' comprehension of audible linguistic information is usually facilitated by the simultaneous availability of visual information (Summerfield, 1979) , infants' responses to bimodal compared with unimodal cues are invariably more robust (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b (Lewkowicz, , 1992b (Lewkowicz, , 1996a (Lewkowicz, , '1998 , and cats' spatial localization responses are greatly facilitated by the concurrent presentation of auditory and visual cues (Stein, Meredith, & Wallace, 1994) . Inhibition occurs when stimulation in one modality produces decreased responsiveness to input in a different modality, such as when intense stimulation in one modality inhibits responsiveness to stimulation in another modality (Welch & Warren, 1986) . Finally, modality-specific attributes in different modalities can be associated together to signify a single object (e.g., the sight, smell, and sizzle of a steak on a grill).
Although intersensory integration based on equivalence detection, or facilitation, inhibition, or association processes is a common way of thinking about intersensory integration, a different way of thinking about it has recently been suggested by Calvert, Brammer, and Iversen (1998) . According to Calvert et al., there are two distinct behavioral and neural intersensory integration processes and mechanisms. One is concerned with the localization of multimodaUy specified objects or events, whereas another is concerned with their identification. The principal advantage of this way of thinking about intersensory interactions is that it helps to distinguish between distinct neural mechanisms underlying such interactions. Calvert et al.'s distinction is not, however, incompatible with the traditional ways of conceptualizing intersensory integration because the perception of equivalence, intersensory facilitation/inhibition, and intersensory association all are involved in both object localization and identification.
Intersensory Perception in Adults and Infants: Empirical Findings
An extensive literature has documented the very impressive abilities of human adults to integrate information across modalities, both through the perception of equivalence and through facilitation/inhibition and association (Freides, 1974; Jones, 1981; Marks, 1978; Massaro, 1998; Ryan, 1940; Welch & Warren, 1980 . Two of the best known examples of intersensory integration in adults are the venWiloquism and the McGurk effects, both of which illustrate how powerful the perceptual system's proclivity for intersensory and perceptual unity is. The ventriloquism effect occurs when participants are presented with a sound that is spatially displaced from a concurrently presented visual stimulus. Despite the fact that the sound does not emanate from the same place as the visual stimulus, participants report heating the sound as actually being closer to the visual stimulus than it really is (Jack & Thurlow, 1973; Radeau & Bertelson, 1977 , 1978 ). An everyday example of this tendency to fuse spatially discrepant auditory and visual inputs is the common experience of hearing the voice of the ventriloquist as coming from the puppet's mouth rather than from his own voice box. The McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976 ) also illustrates the proclivity of the perceptual system to achieve a unified experience. When adults are presented with different audible and visible syllables simultaneously, there are a number of different ways in which they can perceive them depending on the specific syllables presented. For example, the auditory perception of a syllable either can be completely dominated by the concurrent presentation of a different visible syllable (i.e., participants report heating "va" when a visible "va" and an audible "ba" are presented) or can be partly influenced by a different visible syllable and thus result in a blend (i.e., participants report hearing a "da" when a visible "ga" and an audible "ba" are presented). These types of "biasing" effects where input in one sensory modality tends to dominate responsiveness to input in a different modality are ubiquitous in that they also have been demonstrated for vision and touch in the perception of shape (E. A. Miller, 1972) , size (Rock, 1965) , depth (Singer & Day, 1969) , orientation (Over, 1966) , and texture (Lederman, Thorne, & Jones, 1986) . Perhaps the most dramatic example of intersensory integration is synesthesia--a phenomenon reported by a small minority of individuals who, following stimulation in a given modality, experience sensations in other modalities even though no physical stimulation in those other modalities is presented (Marks, 1978) .
The most common form of synesthesia is known as colored hearing, where speech sounds and music produce not only auditory perceptions but colored visual images as well.
In contrast to the voluminous literature demonstrating intersensory perceptual abilities in adults, the experimental literature demonstrating intersensory perceptual abilities in infants is relatively recent and small. This is despite the fact that a number of writers have over the years called attention to the central role that intersensory integration plays in the development of perception and behavior (Birch & Lefford, 1963 , 1967 Piaget, 1952; H. Werner, 1973) . There are at least two reasons for this state of affairs. One is that sufficiently rigorous and reliable experimental techniques for studying various aspects of infant behavior were only developed during the 1960s. The other is that it was not until E. J. Gibson (1969) published her book Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development that researchers interested in development became interested in the problem of intersensory perception in human infancy. Gibson argued in her book that the perception of invariant intersensory relations was crucial to understanding the development of perception and learning. Following Gibson, other theorists have argued that the ability to perceive the unified nature of multimodal information provides the foundation for the development of perception, cognition, and action. For example, Edelman (1992) and Thelen and Smith (1994) have proposed that intersensory interactions provide the basis for the development of novel elemental behavioral capacities that, in turn, are critical to the development of higher level perceptual and cognitive functions.
Over the past two decades, research has shown that intersensory integration does occur in early development (Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994a; Rose & Ruff, 1987) . One of the problems in organizing the results of this research, however, is that different investigators have used different methods and that these different methods may tap different kinds of processes and skills. In addi-tion, different studies have presented infants with different levels of stimulus complexity, adding further to interpretive difficulty. Therefore, an attempt to organize this evidence must first and foremost examine the principal methods that have been used in this area of research.
Methodological Considerations
One of the principal experimental procedures used in studies of intersensory perception in infants has been the intersensory pairedpreference procedure (Spelke, 1976) . It involves presenting for a set amount of time (typically between 30 s and 2 min) two side-by-side visual events that differ along some dimension together with a sound centered between them. For example, two objects might be seen bouncing out of phase with respect to one another, and the sound might be synchronized with the bounce that one of the visual objects makes each time it reaches bottom. By recording the amount of time that an infant looks at each of the two objects, it is possible to tell whether the infant perceived the relation between the sound and the visual information. The assumption is that if the infant did, then he or she should have looked longer at the object that is synchronized with the sound. Usually, investigators using this procedure refer to positive results as reflecting either intersensory matching, cross-modal matching, intersensory perception of equivalence, or intersensory integration. Successful performance in this type of task means that the infant had to have detected and discriminated the difference between the two visual objects and recognized the intersensory relation between one of them and the concurrent sound.
The habituation/test procedure, and its variant, the familiarization/test procedure, are also used frequently. Both rely on first allowing an infant to become familiar with a certain stimulus and then presenting a novel stimulus to determine, by looking for response recovery, whether the infant can discriminate between them. The habituation/test procedure involves first presenting a stimulus repeatedly during discrete trials, either for a predetermined number of trials or until responsiveness declines to some criterion, whereas the familiarization procedure involves presenting the stimulus for some predetermined amount of time. There are at least three different ways in which the two procedures can be implemented: (a) the multimodal component variation method, (b) the switch method, and (c) the cross-modal transfer method.
The mulfimodal component variation method (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b (Lewkowicz, , 1996a (Lewkowicz, , 1996b Walker-Andrews & Lennon, 1991) involves first habituating infants to an auditory-visual (A-V) compound stimulus and then presenting a series of test trials. Two of these trials are unimodal change trials during which some attribute of either the auditory or visual component is changed while the other component remains unchanged. The third type of test trial is a bimodal change trial during which some attribute of both components is changed simultaneously, thus permitting an assessment of the differential contribution of unimodal versus bimodal information to responsiveness. This method makes it possible to determine whether infants are sensitive and responsive to (a) a specific stimulus attribute in a given sensory modality in the context of information in a different modality and (b) to the intersensory relationship (because the change in a unimodal test trial also produces a change in the intersensory relationship). The simultaneous change in stimulus attribute and intersensory relationship makes it essential to conduct additional control studies to see whether the effects of the unimodal component change are due to the change in that modality and/or to the change in the intersensory relationship.
The switch method was first introduced by Younger and Cohen (1983) to study visual perception. It has been adapted for intersensory perception studies and involves habituating infants to two different compound A-V stimuli (e.g., A 1 + V 1 and A 2 + V2) with the explicit goal of teaching infants that the two components making up each compound are related in some way. Then, during the test trials, the components of the two compounds are switched and infants are now presented with two compounds composed of A 1 + V 2 and A 2 + V 1 (Gogate & Bahrick, 1998) . If infants encoded the specific relationship between the audible and visible components during habituation, then they should exhibit a novelty response to the switched components.
Finally, the cross-modal transfer method (Allen, Walker, Symonds, & Marcell, 1977) involves habituating infants to information in one sensory modality (e.g., a given rhythm) and then testing for recognition of that information by comparing responsiveness to the same and different information in a different modality. Successful cross-modal transfer is indicated by significant response recovery to the different information and no recovery to the same information.
Positive findings from any studies utilizing the habituation/test procedure allow only the conclusion that an infant detected and discriminated a change. They do not allow the conclusion that infants can use the information to recognize an intersensory relationship. Only the paired-preference procedure permits this conclusion because it explicitly requires infants to first recognize the intersensory relation and then make a choice based on it. According to Walker-Andrews (1997) , the distinction between detection and discrimination, on the one hand, and recognition, on the other, is important because it forces one to specify more precisely the processes that are involved in a response in an experiment using a particular method. Similar to Walker-Andrews' distinction between detection and discrimination, detection here means that an infant is sensitive and responsive to some kind of stimulation, whereas discrimination means that an infant is able to tell the difference between two or more objects or events. Recognition, on the other hand, involves more. It means that infants are not only able to detect and discriminate between different features of the stimulation but also able to recognize the relationship between one of the visual stimuli and a concurrently presented auditory stimulus on the basis of some common feature and to perform an explicit response (e.g., choose to look longer at one of the stimuli and thus show a preference for it). Consistent with the distinction between detection and discrimination, on the one hand, and recognition, on the other, Bahrick and Pickens (1994) have argued that the habituation/test method is less demanding than the paired-preference method because the latter requires greater attentional mobility and more sophisticated cognitive skills.
Infant Findings
Overall, infant research has shown that some intersensory capacifies are present at birth, some emerge within the first months after birth, and that the specific age at which certain ones emerge depends on the characteristics of the information to be integrated. Lewkowicz & Turkewitz (1980) 3 weeks A-V Streri (1987) 2-3 months T-V Lewkowicz (1992b) 2 Matching of A and V stimulation on the basis of intensity Transfer of shape from vision to touch Discrimination of rate/synchrony differences in the A, V, and A-V components of a simple compound A-V stimulus composed of a moving/sounding disk Detection of synchrony relations; identification of synchrony/asynchrony threshold at --350 ms. Matching based on temporal synchrony and temporal microstructure specifying object composition Matching based on temporal synchrony and temporal microstructure specifying object composition; no matching based on modality-specific cues (pitch & color) Matching based on rate and synchrony Matching of discontinuous object motion and sounds (on the basis of synchrony) Matching based on simple rhythm When presented with continuous bimodal utterances, discrimination of only V and A-V attributes at younger ages but of A, V, and A-V at the oldest age When presented with isolated bimodal syllables, discrimination of only A and A-V attributes at 4 & 6 months but of A, V, and A-V at 8 months Failure to make rate-based matches (moving V stimuli and punctate sounds); successful synchrony-based matching Failure to make rate-based matches (flashing checkerboards/pulsing tones) Matching of A and V attributes of syllables McGurk effect Matching on the basis of synchrony and substance Transfer of shape from touch to vision but not from vision to touch Discrimination of vocal expressions of emotion when presented together with the face 6-& 8-month-olds, but not 3-month-olds, performed duration-based matching Rate/synchrony-based discrimination of only the A and A-V components of an A-V compound stimulus made up of a flashing checkerboard and pulsing tone Despite prior familiarization, failure to make rate/synchrony-based matches of moving visual stimuli and punctate sounds Only 7-month-olds matched color/shape of objects & pitch Tactual to visual transfer of shape but not oral to visual Visual to tactual transfer of shape Cross-modal transfer of rhythm Failure to make rate-based matches of spatially static visual stimuli & sounds Discrimination of A-V rhythm Discrimination of A-V rate against variations in A-V rhythm, but not rhythm against varying tempo Metaphorical matching of facial emotional expression and sound quality 7-but not 5-month-olds matched the A & V attributes of emotion Rate/synchrony-based discrimination of the A, V, and A-V components of an A-V compound stimulus (flashing checkerboard and pulsing tone) Metaphorical matching of abstract visual stimuli and sounds Successful cross-modal transfer from touch to vision Note. A-V = auditory-visual; T-V = tactual-visual. Table 1 provides a summary of the results of the studies examining infant intersensory functioning discussed in this article (other reviews may be found in Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994a) .
One historically early example documenting the operation of intersensory integration shortly after birth comes from a study by Lewkowicz and Turkewitz (1980) , who showed that infants as young as 3 weeks of age can perceive the equivalence of auditory and visual inputs on the basis of intensity. Other studies have shown that newborns can associate objects and sounds on the basis of the combined cues of colocation and synchrony (Morrongiello, Fenwick, & Chance, 1998) , that 4-month-olds can perceive the equivalence of the audible and visible information specifying a syllable (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1982) , that 5-month-olds exhibit the McGurk effect (Rosenblum, Schmuclder, & Johnson, 1997) , and that 7-but not 5-month-old infants can recognize A-V relations in multimodally specified emotional expressions (Walker-Andrews, 1986) . Studies also have shown that, when presented with simple objects and sounds, infants between 3 and 4 months of age can detect intersensory synchrony and temporal microstructure (Bahrick, 1983 (Bahrick, , 1988 (Bahrick, , 1992 Lewkowicz, 1992a ). It appears, however, that they can do so as long as the visual stimulation is spatially dynamic. If the visual stimulation is spatially static, it is not until 6 months of age that they can recognize a synchrony/duration-based A-V relation (Lewkowicz, 1986) . Initial studies of visual-tactile transfer showed that both 6-and 12-month-old infants could transfer shape information (Gottfried, Rose, & Bridger, 1977; Rose, Gotffried, & Bridger, 1981a , 1981b but that the younger infants needed more time to encode the information in one modality before performing the cross-modal transfer. More recent studies have found cross-modal transfer between these two modalities at younger ages, but they also have found a transfer asymmetry that was attributed to the differential development of the visual and tactile modalities: 2-month-old infants could only transfer information about shape from vision to touch (Streri, 1987) , whereas 5-month-old infants could only transfer shape information from touch to vision (Streri & Pecheux, 1986) .
Evidence of such impressive infant intersensory performance has led Radeau (1994) and Slater and Kirby (1998) to propose that intersensory integrative abilities are innate. Likewise, Marks, Hammeal, and Bornstein (1987) have made the claim that metaphorical cross-modal matching (e.g., pitch-brightness, loudnessbrightness) is based on innate intersensory connections. As discussed later, this view is not new. For example, one key feature of E. J. Gibson's (1969) invariance detection view is that detection of amodal invariants is present at birth. To those inclined to dichotomous developmental thinking (i.e., that a particular behavioral capacity is either learned or innate), such a view could be interpreted to mean that the detection of amodal invariants is innate.
Although a nativistic view is an attractive one, it may be unwarranted on both empirical and theoretical grounds. First, some failures to obtain intersensory integration have been reported (Humphrey & Tees, 1980; Lewkowicz, 1985a Lewkowicz, , 1992a Lewkowicz, , 1994b Lewkowicz, , 1994c Spelke, 1994) , and these should not be ignored for they may indicate that intersensory integration of some types of information is not possible or may be possible only later in development. Second, Marks et al.'s (1987) claim that metaphorical matches reflect innate intersensory connections implies that even newborn infants should be able to make metaphorical matches, but only two reports of successful cross-modal, metaphorical matching have so far been published (Phillips, Wagner, Fells, & Lynch, 1990; Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981) , and the youngest age at which such matches have been reported is 7 months. Finally, if intersensory integration is truly innate, then this means that integration of any sort should be possible at birth. This is not the case. For example, Bahrick (1994) has found that integration based on the association of certain modality-specific properties of objects such as their pitch and shape/color does not emerge until 7 months of age. E. J. Gibson's (1969) increasing specificity principle (see a more detailed discussion of this in the section entitled Theoretical Views on the Development of Intersensory Perception below) holds that infants are responsive to amodai invariants, and thus it could be argued that the ability to associate morality-specific attributes does not depend on the perception of amodal invariants but rather requires a learning phase. In other words, one could argue that this example does not really refute the nativist view. The fact is, however, that, as already shown, perception of some amoral invarian~ (e.g., those specifying affect or some temporal attributes) also does not emerge until later in infancy. The Gibsonian increasing specificity principle could be invoked to explain such findings by arguing that perceptual differentiation during the months following birth allows infants to perceive increasingly finer and more complex amodal invariants, but this only dilutes the nativist position by admitting that a little bit of innate and a little bit of acquired are both necessary. Perhaps the emergence of some intersensory skills later in development depends not so much on the differentiation of these kinds of amodal invariants per se as on the prior perceptual differentiation of the relevant information in each morality.
The nativistic view, or the innate-acquired dichotomy, is antithetical to achieving an ultimate understanding of the developmental process (Johnston, 1987; Oyama, 1985) . A newborn infant is essentially an altricial organism whose central nervous system (CNS) and sensory/perceptual apparatus are immature and inexperienced. The development, differentiation, and sharpening of the infant's sensory/perceptual and cognitive capacities are slow and gradual processes that last a relatively long time. This means that substantial changes in the way infants respond to intersensory relations could reasonably be expected and probably have not as yet been uncovered because the focus of most of the work to date has been on demonstrating the existence of intersensory abilities rather than on exploring their limits. A nativistic approach discourages searching both for the limits of intersensory perceptual abilities in early development and for the processes underlying their development.
The general aim of this article is to present a different view of intersensory perception in early development. Instead of making nativistic assumptions, this article asks what developmental processes might be involved in the emergence of intersensory perceptual abilities. The principal focus of interest here is the perception of equivalence because, as noted earlier, the perception of similarity is a fundamental problem for psychology regardless of whether one deals with sensory, perceptual, cognitive, or linguistic questions. Furthermore, this article focuses on how and under what conditions infants perceive equivalent intersensory temporal relations. There are two reasons for choosing the perception of temporal intersensory equivalence. One is the universality of the time dimension. As Marks (1978) has noted, "if there is any attribute that truly deserves to be called a common sensible, any attribute of objects or events that really can manifest itself through all of the senses, it is time" (p. 32; italics in original). Indeed, the temporal dimension of stimulation is a fundamental basis for intersensory integration that cuts across sensory, perceptual, cognitive, social, and linguistic experiences. The second reason is that many of the empirical investigations of infants' intersensory perceptual abili-ties have either directly or indirectly explored the role of temporal information in intersensory integration. As a result, a substantial body of research findings has become available on this question, and a relatively detailed and formal analysis of temporally based intersensory perception in early development is now possible. It is hoped that such an analysis might permit the generation of some general principles for the development of intersensory integration and the specification of underlying processes with a degree of precision that has not been attempted to date.
Perception of Temporal Information in Development
The temporal flow of events is an inescapable part of our life. By virtue of their temporal character, events can usually be characterized in terms of duration, rate, and overall rhythmic quality. In addition, because most temporally organized objects and events are represented by multimodal sensory qualities, the sensory representations of these objects and events in each modality normally occur at the same time and, thus, are temporally contiguous. A good example illustrating the intersensory temporal properties of a multimodal event is a person playing the violin. As the violinist draws the bow across the strings, an observer can see and hear that the visible actions of the ann are temporally contiguous with the heard actions of the arm and that each discrete up-and-down movement of the arm has a specific duration. In addition, as the violinist repeatedly moves the bow up and down, the observer can see and hear that the action occurs at a certain rate over time and that it has a specific rhythmic quality to it.
The fact that a human observer usually has little difficulty perceiving the equivalent nature of the visible and audible aspects of such an event is testimony to our general ability to integrate the multimodal properties of temporal events into unified perceptual experiences. With specific regard to the integration of multimodal temporal inputs, studies have shown that adults are sensitive to the temporal synchrony of heteromodal inputs (Dixon & Spitz, 1980; Massaro, 1998; Massaro, Cohen, & Smeele, 1996; McGrath & Summerfield, 1985) , respond to temporal variations in one modality differently in the presence of temporal stimulation in another modality than in its absence (Myers, Cotton, & Hilp, 1981) , and can make intersensory matches based on the specific temporal pattern of stimulation (Gebhard & Mowbray, 1959; Handel & Buffardi, 1969) . In contrast, infants find it more difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to perceive the integral nature of certain forms of multimodal temporal structure (Lewkowicz, 1994a) . This raises two questions. First, what abilities might infants lack and adults possess that make it possible to perceive the integral nature of multimodal, temporal structure? Second, how do such abilities come about in development?
To be sure, such questions have been asked before, but they were asked of children, not of infants, and were specifically concerned not with intersensory integration but with the general question of the perception and understanding of time. Piaget (1969 Piaget ( , 1970 carried out the classic investigations of these types of questions in children, and it was he who first pointed out the theoretical importance of such questions for understanding the development of general perceptual and cognitive skills. Based on his work on the perception of duration, Piaget proposed that children initially cannot perceive time directly because they cannot coordinate the distance that an object travels and the speed of its motion in estimating time. He based this conclusion on the results from his trains problem where children were shown two moving trains and were asked to estimate the relative duration of travel when the trains' start and stop points, speed, and distance were varied. He found that young children had difficulty coordinating the various indicators of duration and concluded that children must construct the concept of time from information extracted about speed and distance. In other words, he assumed that inferential processes must operate on temporally discrete sense data and that, as a result, the perception of time and its duration is not directly available to the perceptual system but must be inferred from other knowledge. This theoretical position led Piaget to believe that children do not attain a mature concept of time until middle childhood, when they begin to understand the relationship between time, speed, and distance.
In contrast to Piaget and his theory, E. J. Gibson (1969) posited that duration is directly available to perception right from birth. Even more importantly, and in direct contrast to Piaget, Gibson proposed that various temporal dimensions are amodal in nature and, as a result, that they are available to all sensory modalities tight from birth. In fact, the results from subsequent studies investigating children's perception of time are generally consistent with this view in showing that children do not need to understand the relationship between time, speed, and distance to have at least a rudimentary understanding of time. They show that as long as children understand the relative start and stop times of moving objects, they are able to judge relative durations (Acredolo, 1989; Levin, 1982) . What is not clear from these results, however, is how early in development the ability to process multimodally represented, temporal information emerges. According to Gibson's theory, infants could be expected to perceive and integrate the multimodal attributes of temporal experience such as temporal synchrony, duration, rate, and rhythm. Gibson takes it as a given that infants perceive intermodal invariants and thus, by extension, that they perceive the temporal relation between inputs in different modalities.
At the time that Piaget and Gibson put forth their theoretical positions, there was little, if any, empirical information on infants' perception and responsiveness to multisensory temporal information. Since that time, however, a great deal of empirical evidence has been gathered on this question, allowing it to be revisited. I review this empirical evidence and show that infants are capable of responding to intersensory temporal relations but that responsiveness to some types of temporal relations emerges earlier than responsiveness to others. Also, I show that, although Gibson's theory predicts that infants should be able to pick up temporal intersensory relations right from birth and that they should become more adept at picking up increasingly more complex intersensory relations as they develop, the theory does not go far enough. It does not specify when responsiveness to specific intersensory temporal relations emerges, what processes underlie the emergence of responsiveness to increasingly more complex intersensory temporal relations, and what processes are responsible for the observed developmental transitions. The principal aim of the remainder of this article is to address these issues. This is done by (a) reviewing the empirical evidence on infants' responsiveness to intersensory temporal relations, (b) discussing extant theoretical approaches to the development of intersensory perception and to the development of behavior in general, and (c) proposing a model and a set of developmental principles designed to account for the developmental emergence of responsiveness to intersensory temporal relations.
A Taxonomy of Intersensory Temporal Relations and Their Perception in Early Development
As events flow over time, they provide an observer with a steady stream of temporally organized and intermodally integrated information (Ashton, 1976; Lashley, 1951; Lewkowicz, 1989; C. L. Miller & Byme, 1984) . For example, when infants interact with their caretakers they must constantly deal with a wealth of multimodal, temporally organized information. That is, each time a caregiver talks and interacts with an infant, the multimodal information specifying the caretaker can be specified in terms of the temporal synchrony between audible and visible attributes, their duration, rate, and rhythmic quality. Figure 1 illustrates this fact in schematic form. As can be seen, when the caregiver produces a word, the voice starts and stops at the same time that the lips start and stop moving. In addition, each individual visible and audible instantiation of a given word has a specific and equal duration. On a more global level (i.e., at the level of the entire utterance), two types of intermodally integrated, temporal information are available. First, as the caregiver speaks, he or she utters the words at a certain temporal rate, and that rate is the same regardless of whether it is heard or seen. Second, the caregiver's utterance is usually imbued with an overall rhythmic quality that also is the same whether it is heard or seen. One key aspect of the temporal information characterizing the utterance illustrated in Figure 1 is that it is embedded. For example, the temporal synchrony between the audible and visible attributes of the utterance depicted in Figure 1 is embedded within intersensory duration, rate, and rhythm equivalence. Put differently, in order for the infant to perceive the equivalence of the audible and visible components of the utterance in terms of either their duration, rate, or rhythmic structure, the infant must be able to perceive their synchronous onsets and offsets. Likewise, in order for the infant to perceive A-V equivalence based on the overall rhythmic quality of the utterance, the infant must be able to perceive the equivalence of the audible and visible components and of the intervals separating them in terms of their duration.
Are infants sensitive and responsive to the various types of temporal information shown in Figure 1 ? This is a two-part ques-
Audible:
Boy, you look sooo goood ! tion. One part is whether infants are sensitive and responsive to temporal information regardless of whether it is uni-or multimodal. The other is whether infants are sensitive and responsive to intersensory temporal relations. In general, evidence indicates that infants are sensitive and responsive to different types of temporal variations. For example, infants exhibit sensitivity to a change in the temporal distribution of stimulation (Brooks & Berg, 1979; Clifton, 1974; Davies & Berg, 1983; Donohue & Berg, 1991) and can perform anticipatory responses based on temporal information. The latter ability is evident in the fact that they can preform their hands in anticipation of the future position of an object as it moves through space (Lockman, Ashmead, & Bushnell, 1984; von Hofsten, 1980 von Hofsten, , 1985 and can learn to anticipate the spatial position of an object as evidenced by anticipatory eye movements (Canfield & Halth, 1991) . Finally, infants can organize their behavioral actions in a temporally meaningful way (Stem, Beebe, Jaffe, & Bennet, 1977) and to such an extent that their interactions with a caregiver are usually characterized by relatively precise temporal interlocking (Lester, Hoffman, & Brazelton, 1985) . Indeed, it appears that these types of temporally based perceptual and motor capacities in infancy may provide an important developmental foundation for the emergence of cognitive abilities later in life. Thus, Haith and his colleagues (Dougherty & Haith, 1997) have shown that there is a relationship between infant visual reaction time/visual anticipation at 3.5 months of age and childhood full-scale IQ on the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence---Revised at 46 months of age. Given that infants can perceive and respond to temporally organized information, it might be expected that they also could perceive the types of intersensory equivalence relations illustrated in Figure 1 . In general, findings regarding infants' responsiveness to these types of relations indicate that infants are, in fact, sensitive and responsive to some of these intersensory temporal relations. In addition, the findings indicate that the ability to respond to different aspects of multimodal temporal structure emerges at different times in development. Specifically, it seems that intersensory responsiveness to temporal synchrony emerges first, followed by the emergence of responsiveness to duration, rate, and rhythm in that order.
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Perception of A-V Temporal Synchrony and the Intersensory Temporal Contiguity Window
Intersensory temporal synchrony is a fundamental temporal dimension that is likely to serve as an important foundation for intersensory integration in early development (Edelman, 1992; Thelen & Smith, 1994) because it can provide a simple and relatively easy basis for the perception of intersensory unity. Perhaps it is for this reason that responsiveness to temporal synchrony is one of the most intensively studied aspects of intersensory perception in infants. In general, empirical findings have shown that infants are sensitive and responsive to intersensory temporal synchrony (Bahrick, 1988; Lewkowicz, 1986 Lewkowicz, , 1992a Lewkowicz, , 1992b Lewkowicz, , 1996b Speike, 1988; Speike, Born, & Chu, 1983) and that responsiveness to it emerges very early in life. Moreover, Bahrick (1998) has recently reported that A-V temporal synchrony has developmental priority over other intersensory relations. She showed that infants as young as 4 weeks of age respond to the disruption of the synchronous relationship between an object's motion and the sound that it makes but that it is not until 7 weeks of age that infants exhibit sensitivity to the disruption of the association between a specific sound and a specific object.
Most recently, Slater, Quinn, Brown, and Hayes (1999) have reported that newborn infants can associate objects and linguistic tokens on the basis of synchrony. Each of two groups of infants was familiarized with two different object/sound pairings; in one group, the sound was presented contingent on the infant's looking at the visual object (and thus synchronously with it), and in the other group, the sound was presented noncontingently (by repeatedly presenting the sound every second for 25 s regardless of looking during each familiarization trial). Then, using the switch method, Slater et al. gave infants two test trials during which sound presentation was contingent on looking. The familiar object/sound pairing was presented in the familiar test trial, but it was switched in the novel test trial. The contingent familiarization group exhibited response recovery to the object/sound switch, but the noncontingent familiarization group did not. This finding was interpreted as evidence that infants detected the synchrony-based intersensory relation. There are two problems, however, that make it unclear whether these findings constitute evidence of synchrony-based matching. One is that a critical control group that would make the conclusion that infants had learned the association on the basis of synchrony more certain was not run. The critical data that allowed Slater et al. to conclude that synchrony mediated the making of the intersensory association came from the contingent familiarization group, which was familiarized to the synchronous presentation of the object and sound and then tested to the synchronous but switched object/sound pair. What is missing is a condition where the object and sound are presented synchronously during familiarization and then the same object and sound are presented asynchronously during testing. In addition, there is a confound in the study that raises the opposite possibility that the reason that the infants in the noncontingent group failed to make the intersensory association was because they experienced an overall greater amount of stimulation (they heard the sound every second regardless of looking) that exceeded their optimal level of preferred stimulation. Studies by myself and associates (Gardner, Lewkowicz, Rose, & Karmel, 1986; Lewkowicz & Turkewitz, 1981) have shown that neonates regulate the amount of visual stimulation that they look at depending on the amount of auditory stimulation. Indeed, consistent with this fact is the report by Slater et al. that many more participants in the noncontingent group dropped out of the experiment. Given these problems, it is still not certain whether newborn infants can respond to temporal intersensory synchrony.
If intersensory temporal synchrony is such an important and basic type of intersensory relation, one important question is what exactly constitutes temporal synchrony for infants. Put differently, one could ask whether the audible and visible attributes of an object or event have to occur at precisely the same time for infants to perceive them as synchronous, or whether they can have some "temporal slippage" between them and still be perceived as synchronous. Fraisse (1982a) showed that adult observers can tolerate some temporal slippage. On the basis of this observation, he postulated the "psychological present" concept to capture the idea that the heteromodal components specifying a multimodal event do not have to physically occur at the same time to be psychologically perceived as simultaneous. Indeed, the same is true for infants except that they can tolerate greater amounts of temporal intersensory slippage than adults can.
The psychological present for adults depends on the order in which the audible and visible attributes of a multimodal event occur. Studies show that when adults watch an object bouncing on a surface and listen to an impact sound associated with that object, they perceive the sound and bounce as occurring in synchrony as long as the sound does not precede the visible bounce by more than 80 ms. If the sound is delayed with respect to the visible bounce, adults perceive the two as synchronous as long as the delay does not exceed 140 ms (McGrath & Summerfield, 1985; Summerfield, 1979) . Thus, an intersensory temporal contiguity window (ITCW) appears to govern responsiveness to the temporal relation between the auditory and visual components of an A-V compound stimulus; as long as the audible and visible components of an A-V event fall within this temporal window, they are perceived as synchronous. To determine how wide the ITCW might be in infants, I (Lewkowicz, 1996b) conducted a series of studies in which I investigated infants' responses to different intersensory temporal asynchronies. There were a priori reasons to suspect that the window might be substantially wider in infants. First, conditioning studies have shown that, compared with adults, infants require longer conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus intervals for successful classical conditioning (Caldwell & Werboff, 1962; Ingram, 1978) . Second, the nervous system undergoes dramatic structural and functional changes during postnatal life (Garey & Y a n , 1993; Scheibel, 1993; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967) , with changes in conduction velocity being one important and prominent feature (Karmel, Gardner, Zappulla, Magnano, & Brown, 1988) .
To assess possible developmental changes in responsiveness to A-V temporal synchrony relations, I studied infants between 2 and 8 months of age. Using an infant-controlled habituation/test procedure, infants were first habituated to a synchronous A-V event consisting of a visual object (a green disk) moving up and down on a TV monitor and a percussive sound that occurred each time the object reversed direction at the bottom of the screen. During the test trials, the visible bounce and the sound were temporally offset by different amounts. Results indicated that there were no age differences in responsiveness and showed that infants required a minimum asynchrony interval of 350 ms to exhibit discrimination when the sound preceded the visible bounce and a minimum interval of 450 ms when the sound followed the visible bounce. Figure 2 shows the results from an experiment in which asynchronies of 150, 250, and 350 ms were presented and indicates that infants discriminated an asynchrony of 350 ms hut not lower ones.
To determine how infants' responsiveness might compare to that of adults, I conducted a separate study with the identical stimuli and a modified procedure in which I exposed adult participants first to the synchronous event and then to a series of asynchronous test events. I then asked them to indicate which of the test events was asynchronous. In contrast to infants, adults required an asynchrony of only 65 ms when the sound preceded the visible bounce and an asynchrony of 112 ms when the sound followed the visible bounce to discriminate the test events from the synchronous one. These values are in general agreement with previous findings from studies with adult participants (Dixon & Spitz, 1980; Summerfield, 1979) . One of the interesting aspects of the findings from both infants and adults is that they required a longer temporal separation between the audible and visible bounce when the audible bounce followed the visible bounce. I (Lewkowicz, 1996b) interpreted this effect to reflect both the longer neural transduction speed of the visual as opposed to the auditory signals at the receptor level and the ensuing longer response latency to visual signals at the cortical level (Regan, 1989) . I argued that if the differential neural processing of the auditory and visual signals is taken into account, then the psychological size of the ITCW ends up being the same regardless of signal order, and the resulting infant 1TCW is equal to approximately 350 ms.
Perception of Duration-Based lntersensory Equivalence
Very limited information regarding developmental changes in infants' responsiveness to duration, and particularly their responsiveness to intersensory duration-based equivalence, is available. Indirect evidence suggests that infants can respond to unimodally specified differences in duration in both auditory and visual modalities and that this value is below 100 ms (Karmel, Lester, McCarvill, Brown, & Hofmann, 1977; Lewkowicz, 1985b; Morrongiello & Trehub, 1987; L. A. Werner, Marean, Halpin, & Spemer, 1992) . For example, infants have been shown to attend differentially to visual stimulation differing in its temporal rate of presentation, implying that they can use interstimulus duration differences to discriminate between different rates. In fact, Regal (1981) has reported that the critical flicker frequency in 4-weekold infants is as high as 40.7 Hz, implying that infants as young as 1 month of age are sensitive to interpulse durations as small as 25 ms. Similarly, in the auditory modality, infants can discriminate auditory duration changes of as little as 20 ms (Morrongiello & Trehub, 1987) .
Only one study has investigated whether infants can perceive the intersensory equivalence of duration (Lewkowicz, 1986) . In this study, I gave 3-, 6-, and 8-month-old infants two kinds of paired-preference trials. During the first 6 silent trials, infants viewed pairs of checkerboards flashing at the same rate but for different durations. During the next 12 sound trials, infants viewed the same pairs of checkerboards but this time accompanied by a sound whose duration, onset, and offset corresponded to one of the checkerboards. The checkerboards were flashed at one of three durations (400, 800, and 1,600 ms), and all possible pairs of the three durations were presented. Clear evidence of intersensory matching was found in the 6-and 8-month-old infants for the 400-1,600 ms and the 800-1,600 ms pairs. For each pair, infants looked longer at the visual stimulus whose duration was the same as the duration of the auditory stimulus, and they also looked at it longer in the presence of the matching sound than in the absence of sound. Interestingly enough, the results also indicated that the onset and offset synchrony between the matching visual and auditory stimuli contributed to intersensory matching. This was indicated by the results from a second experiment where infants were tested with the identical stimuli except that the onset and offset of the sound occurred 300 ms after the onset and offset of the corresponding visual stimulus. In this case, infants no longer performed intersensory matching. This latter finding suggests that what appeared to be duration-based matching in the first experiment was actually synchrony-based matching. When the results from studies of infant rate-based intersensory matching are discussed later in this article, it is shown that the results from the asynchrony experiment actually mean that infants required both synchrony and duration cues to detect the duration-based intersensory equivalence.
The only other research on the intersensory perception of duration comes from animal studies. For example, adult rodents have been found to perceive the duration of a signal in the visual or auditory modality and to then transfer that information to the other modality (Meck & Church, 1982; Roberts, 1982; Tees & Symons, 1987) . On the basis of this finding, some have made the assumption that the cross-modal transfer of duration reflects the operation of an underlying clock mechanism common to all modalities and that this ability is dependent on genetically determined neural circuits. The evidence cited in support of this nativist position comes from studies showing that dark-reared rats display no deficits in their cross-modal transfer of duration (Tees & Symons, 1987) . Despite the fact that dark rearing has no effect on crossmodal transfer of duration in rats, however, the question of the developmental origins of intersensory responsiveness to duration is still very much an open one. First, if cross-modal transfer of duration reflects the operation of an underlying clock that is common to all modalities, then it is possible that dark-reared rats might acquire the ability to distinguish between different durations in the auditory or somesthetic modalities and that this might then generalize to other modalities including the visual. Second, tests to determine whether developmental experience is necessary for the differentiation of intersensory duration have not been done in other species, including humans. Third, my (Lewkowicz, 1986) finding that a response to the intersensory equivalence of duration does not emerge before 6 months of age in human infants suggests that intersensory responsiveness to duration in humans may depend on experience.
Perception of Rate-Based Intersensory Equivalence
Discrimination of temporal rate differences appears to be relatively easy for infants, regardless of whether these differences are represented by unimodal or bimodal attributes. For example, studies have shown that infants (even right after birth) can discriminate between different visually (Gardner et al., 1986; Karmel et al., 1977; Lewkowicz, 1985b ) and bimodally specified rates (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b Pickens & Bahrick, 1997) . Other studies have shown that infants can respond to unimodal rate differences in the context of unchanging rate information in a second sensory modality (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b (Lewkowicz, , 1992b and to the invariant properties of bimodally specified temporal rate against variations in bimodally specified rhythm (Pickens & Bahrick, 1997) .
If infants can discriminate unimodally and bimodally specified temporal rates and if temporal rate can provide an important basis for relating sensory inputs across modalities, the obvious question is whether infants can perceive rate-based intersensory equivalence. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is equivocal because of a number of contradictory findings in the literature. The only positive findings on infants' intersensory perception of ratebased equivalence come from a study by Spelke (1979) . She presented 4-month-old infants with two side-by-side puppets bouncing against a surface at different rates and a percussive sound that was synchronized with the bounce of one of these puppets. Spelke reported that infants looked longer at the puppet whose rate of bouncing was the same as the rate at which the sound occurred and concluded that they detected the A-V temporal relation. In contrast to Spelke's findings, however, both Humphrey and Tees (1980) and I (Lewkowicz, 1985a) failed to obtain evidence of rate-based intersensory matching. There was one possible reason for the different outcomes. Whereas Spelke (1979) presented moving visual stimuli, Humphrey and Tees (1980) and I (Lewkowicz, 1985a) presented spatially static visual stimuli. Visual motion happens to be a highly salient stimulus attribute for infants (Kaufmann, Stucki, & Kaufmann-Hayoz, 1985) and allows infants to extract certain types of information that they cannot extract when only spatially static information is presented (Kellman, 1984; Kellman, Spelke, & Short, 1986) . This makes it possible that the lack of motion made intersensory matching difficult in the Lewkowicz (1985a) and Humphrey and Tees (1980) studies.
To determine whether motion might be the critical variable that makes rate-based intersensory matching possible, I (Lewkowicz, 1992a) conducted a set of experiments that investigated infants' rate-based intersensory matching with moving visual stimuli. Four-and 8-month-old infants were given a series of twelve 30-s paired-preference trials during which pairs of stimuli bouncing up and down on each side of a computer monitor were shown. During each trial, the two visual stimuli bounced at different rates. All possible pairs of three rates (.22, .42, and .98 Hz) were presented across trials. As the stimuli bounced, a tone was sounded each time one of the two visual stimuli reached bottom and reversed trajectory. Thus, the rate at which the auditory stimulus was sounded corresponded to the rate at which one of the visual stimuli bounced. Results indicated that despite the fact that the visual stimuli were spatially dynamic, no evidence of intersensory matching was obtained. In response to these findings, Spelke (1994) revisited the question of whether infants were capable of making rate-based intersensory matches and concluded that her original conclusions regarding infants' intersensory matching based on rate were perhaps unwarranted.
What might be the reason for the difficulty that infants appear to have in making rate-based intersensory matches? One possibility is that it may be too difficult for them to process the differential rate of visual motion at the same time that they have to process the synchrony/rate relation between the sound and the corresponding visual stimulus. I (Lewkowicz, 1992a) addressed this possibility in another experiment by reducing the complexity of the task. This time both visual stimuli were made to bounce at the same rate but were made to bounce out of phase with respect to one another during a given test trial. This was done by having one of them appear on the screen at the start of a trial followed a short time later by the appearance of the other stimulus. In this way, the visual stimuli making up a given pair no longer differed in terms of motion velocity and thus rate. Across trials, the two visual stimuli were moved at one of three rates (either .32, .49, or .73 Hz) . In one block of 6 trials, the sound occurred in conjunction with the bounce of the visual stimulus that appeared first on the screen (i.e., the leading visual stimulus), whereas, in the other block, the sound occurred in conjunction with the bounce of the visual stimulus that appeared second (i.e., the lagging visual stimulus). Results supported the hypothesis that the complexity of the task might have prevented infants from making intersensory matches because both the 4-and the 8-month-old infants exhibited intersensory matching. Specifically, they looked longer at the sounding/leading stimulus when the leading visual stimulus was associated with the sound, both in the slow-motion and in the medium-motion condition. In addition, infants did not look longer at the leading stimulus when the sound did not correspond to it, indicating that they were responding to the intersensory relation rather than to the fact that this stimulus appeared first on the screen. Taken together, the findings from this (Lewkowicz, 1992a ) study showed that infants as young as 4 months of age can recognize the temporal relation of spatially dynamic sights and corresponding sounds but that this ability is limited to synchrony-based, rather than synchrony/ratebased, relations.
Although making synchrony/rate-based intersensory matches may be difficult for infants, it may be possible that this difficulty might be overcome with some prior experience with such complex temporal relationships. This is suggested by the findings from a study by Bahrick (1988) . She showed that when infants are first given a familiarization procedure and then given an intersensory equivalence perception task, they exhibit matching even though they do not exhibit matching without prior familiarization. To determine whether prior short-term experience might make it possible for infants to detect the kinds of rate-based relations presented in my earlier study (Lewkowicz, 1992a) , I conducted another series of experiments (Lewkowicz, 1994b) in which infants f'trst were familiarized with a rate-based intersensory relation and then were tested with the same procedures as in the earlier (Lewkowicz, 1992a) study. Despite the initial familiarization, the results from this set of experiments indicated that infants still did not recognize the rate-based A-V relationship.
There was yet a third possible reason for the failure to exhibit rate-based intersensory matching. The kinds of stimuli used by Humphrey and Tees (1980) and myself (Lewkowicz, 1992a) were rather "impoverished." In the case of my (Lewkowicz, 1992a) study, the visual stimuli were identical, flat, green disks that differed only in their speed of motion. The sound was the same regardless of which stimulus it was associated with and differed only in terms of its temporal relation to a given visual stimulus. Thus, one possibility is that infants need a set of distinctive features to distinguish the visual and auditory information to detect rate-based intersensory relations. Although, as shown earlier, this is not the case for the perception of duration-and synchrony-based intersensory relations, it may be the case for the perception of more complex temporal relations. To investigate this possibility, I (Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1998) recently conducted a series of studies in which, prior to testing for intersensory matching, I gave separate groups of 4-, 6-, and 8-month-old infants an opportunity to become familiar with each of the multimodal events that they would see and hear in the subsequent paired-preference trials. To accentuate the differences between the two visual stimuli, I rendered them on a computer monitor as three-dimensional objects that differed in color and size. The sounds also differed from each other in that the sound that corresponded to one of the objects was a low-pitched, resonant, complex sound, whereas the other sound was a higher pitched, tinny, complex sound. Results showed that despite the use of the familiarization procedure and the presentation of highly distinctive events, infants did not make intersensory matches. Consistent with the prior findings (Lewkowicz, 1992a) , however, when rate differences were removed and only synchrony specified the intersensory relation, infants did make intersensory matches and did so even without a prior familiarization phase.
When all the findings on intersensory rate matching are considered together, they suggest that the perception of rate-based intersensory equivalence is difficult for infants as old as 8 months of age, It should be noted, however, that all the studies reviewed so far employed the intersensory paired-preference task, which, according to Bahrick and Pickens (1994) , is a difficult one for infants and might belie their true competence. Indeed, in studies using the multimodal component variation method, I (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b ) did find some evidence that infants perceive rate-based intersensory relations. Infants were habituated to a flashing checkerboard and a sound pulsing at the same rate and were then tested with a change in the rate of one or the other of the two components. This resulted in a change in the rate-based relation between the audible and visible components and thus could serve as a test of whether the infants could discriminate the change in that relation. Results showed that 10-month-old, but not 6-month-old, infants responded to the change in the intersensory rate relation, suggesting that 10-month-old infants can perceive a rate-based A-V relation.
One factor that might possibly complicate this interpretation is that when the rate of one of the components was changed in these studies, the synchrony relation between the auditory and visual components also changed. Therefore, it might be argued that rather than responding to a rate change, infants responded either to a change in the synchrony relation and/or to a change in the synchrony/rate relation. It is unlikely, however, that responsiveness was based on the synchrony change alone because if that were the case, then the 6-month-old infants should have been able to detect the changes. That they did not suggests at a minimum that the perception of intersensory relations on the basis of temporal rate depends on the joint attributes of rate and synchrony and that such perception may not emerge until late in infancy. This conclusion is supported by my (Lewkowicz, 1985a) failure to find intersensory matching by 4-month-old infants in a study in which a sound corresponded both in terms of synchrony and rate to one of two flashing checkerboards. If synchrony were sufficient as a relational cue and even if infants were unable to make the matches based solely on rate, they should have been able to perform them. The fact that they did not suggests that synchrony alone is not sufficient when rate covaries with it. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the findings from my (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b studies in showing that infants younger than 10 months of age do not perceive intersensory temporal relations based on joint synchrony/rate relations.
Perception of Rhythm-Based Intersensory Equivalence
Questions about the processes underlying the perception of rhythmic structure, as well as about structure in general, are fundamental to the study of perception because structure is an abstract property that transcends any particular stimulus and gives meaning to events (Pomerantz & Lockhead, 1991) . Rhythmic structure is also fundamental on the production side because most of our motor behaviors are rhythmically organized. Despite structure's obvious importance, it is curious that the developmental foundations underlying the perception of temporal structure are virtually unexplored and that most theorists (Bregman, 1990; Fraisse, 1982a; Handel, 1989; Martin, 1972) simply posit an innate basis for it with very scant empirical support for this position.
As in the case of rate, there is some evidence indicating that infants can discriminate differences in rhythm. For example, Demany, McKenzie, and Vurpillot (1977) and Washburn and Cohen (1984) reported that infants as young as 2 months of age can discriminate between different auditory rhythmic sequences, and Mendelson (1986) reported that infants as young as 4 months of age can discriminate between different visual rhythmic sequences. Interpretation of the results from these studies is problematic, however, because the type of temporal structure presented was very simple and, thus, did not exemplify the kind of hierarchically organized temporal structure characteristic of typical rhythmic patterns (see the subsection Rhythm under Differential Informational Complexity below).
There are, however, three studies that are exceptions to this shortcoming. One is a study conducted by Morrongiello (1984) in which infants' response to relatively complex auditory rhythmic patterns that did meet the requirements of true rhythmic structure was investigated. Infants' discrimination between different rhythmical patterns that differed either in absolute terms (i.e., the interelement intervals changed) or in relative terms (i.e., the interelement intervals were presented in novel combinations) was tested. Both 6-and 12-month-old infants detected the difference when it was an absolute one, but only 12-month-olds detected the difference when it was a relative one. Pickens and Bahrick (1995) found successful discrimination of relatively complex A-V rhythmic sequences in 7-month-old infants. Finally, Bahrick and Lickliter (in press), using the same rhythms used by Pickens and Bahrick (1995) , showed that 5-month-old infants could discriminate between them as well. Together, these studies suggest that discrimination of rhythmic patterns emerges by the 5th month of life and that the specific time when responsiveness emerges may depend on pattern complexity and on whether the stimulation is specified unimodally or bimodally.
It is not clear whether and at what age infants can extract the invariant properties of a specific rhythm. On the one hand, Trehub and Thorpe (1989) have found that 7-and 9-month-old infants can successfully categorize auditory sequences on the basis of rhythm. In contrast, Pickens and Bahrick (1997) have found equivocal evidence of 7-month-old infants' ability to categorize bimodal, A-V rhythmic sequences. They habituated infants to a single rhythm presented at three different rates and then tested for discrimination by presenting either a novel rhythm at a novel rate or a familiar rhythm at a novel rate. Results from the two test conditions indicated no successful discrimination and were interpreted to mean that infants of this age cannot abstract the property of rhythm.
Like rate, rhythm can serve as an important basis for the perception of intersensory equivalence. The key question from the present perspective is when the ability to recognize rhythm-based intersensory equivalence emerges. On the basis of the distinctions made earlier between detection, discrimination, and recognition, the most demanding and most developmentally advanced skill is the recognition of rhythm-based intersensory equivalence. Only two studies have investigated infants' perception of rhythm-based intersensory equivalence. Both studies, however, used a crossmodal transfer technique, thus making it impossible to determine whether infants can recognize rhythm-based intersensory equivalence and making it possible to determine only whether they can detect a particular rhythmic pattern and discriminate it from another. Moreover, neither study investigated developmental changes, and each confounded rhythmic structure with another feature. In the first of these two studies, Allen, Walker, Symonds, and Marcell (1977) reported transfer of rhythm between audition and vision in 7-month-old infants. Infants were habituated to either a regularly or an irregularly occurring sequence and then were tested to determine whether they could detect an intra-or intersensory change in the sequence. The sequences consisted of three flashing lights or sounds. In one of the sequences, the elements were separated by two .9-s intervals. In the other sequence, the ftrst and second elements were separated by a .3-s interval, and the second and third elements were separated by a 9-s interval. As a result, the two sequences differed in terms of the first interelement interval and in terms of their overall length. This makes it possible that infants discriminated the two sequences either on the basis of the "local" features of the stimulus sequences (i.e., the first interelement interval) or on the basis of their different lengths, rather than on the basis of their overall rhythmic structure. In the second of these studies, Mendelson and Ferland (1982) familiarized 4-month-old infants with a syllable that was presented repeatedly according to either a regular or an irregular temporal pattern. Then they were tested for transfer of the specific familiarization pattern by viewing a film of a puppet moving its mouth according to one or the other temporal pattern. Although Mendelson and Ferland found transfer, this was only the case in one direction. In addition, the regular sequence used in this study was an isochronous, concatenated sequence of stimuli and thus did not meet the relative timing requirement of a true rhythmic sequence (see the subsection Rhythm under Differential Informational Complexity below for further discussion of rhythmic structure).
Summary of Findings on Perception of Intersensory Temporal Relations
The findings on infants' responsiveness to temporally related auditory and visual information show that infants as young as 1 month of age are sensitive to A-V temporal synchrony relations and that they can tolerate considerably larger intersensory temporal asynchronies than adults can. The early ability to detect intersensory temporal synchrony enables infants as young as 4 weeks of age to discriminate between synchrony and asynchrony; by 4 months of age, infants can make intersensory matches in a paired-preference task. In contrast to this early ability to detect temporal synchrony relations, young infants (between 3 and 4 months of age) show no evidence of making duration-or ratebased intersensory matches. This is the case even when these types of temporal relations covary with temporal synchrony. It is only at 6 months of age that infants begin to exhibit duration/ synchrony-based intersensory matching. Rate/synchrony-based intersensory matching appears to be difficult even for infants as old as 8 months of age, and it is only at 10 months of age that infants exhibit detection of intersensory rate/synchrony relations. Finally, the available evidence concerning infants' response to rhythmbased intersensory relations does not make it possible to draw any definitive conclusions at this time. Overall, the empirical evidence to date suggests that intersensory perception of synchrony-based relations emerges the earliest and that temporal synchrony is involved in infants' perception of duration-based and rate-based equivalence in matching tasks. The evidence also suggests that the ability to detect and discriminate the different forms of intersensory temporal relations emerges earlier in development than the ability to use the temporal information to recognize intersensory equivalence.
What processes may underlie these kinds of abilities, and what theoretical constructs could be helpful in uncovering these processes? To answer this question, ftrst I describe some theoretical approaches that have been put forth to account for the development of intersensory integration, thus putting this question into a general theoretical framework. I then argue that one contemporary theory of development known as epigenetic systems theory may provide helpful conceptual tools for uncovering the mechanisms and processes underlying the development of intersensory perception. Because epigenetic systems theory requires that a search for putative determinants underlying the development of a particular function be conducted at many different levels of organization (ranging from the unicellular to the organismic one) and because development is considered to start at conception, I next consider the contribution of prenatal experience and neural development to the development of intersensory development. I then return to a consideration of the development of intersensory perception of temporal relations by proposing a tentative model and end with a consideration of its generalizability.
Theoretical Views on the Development of Intersensory Perception
Historically, two diametrically opposed theoretical positions have been put forward on the question of the developmental origins of intersensory perception. One, known as the differentiation view and primarily championed by H. Werner (1973), Bower (1974) , and E. J. Gibson (1969) , maintains that the different sensory systems are unified at birth and that, as development progresses, they become gradually differentiated from one another. A radical version of this view is that infants are synesthetes (Maurer, 1993; H. Werner, 1973) and that the senses are thus completely merged at birth. The opposing view, championed by Piaget (1952) and Lefford (1963, 1967) , maintains that the sensory systems are uncoupled at birth and that over time, through self-initiated action (Piaget, 1952) , they gradually become increasingly more coupled as they participate together in coordinated action.
Currently, the most influential theoretical view on the development of intersensory perception is embodied in E. J. Gibson's (1969) general theory of perceptual development. This theory is an extension and direct outgrowth of J. J. Gibson's (1966 Gibson's ( , 1979 direct perception theory, which, in a radical departure from traditional views that considered perception to b e a collection of separate sensations, held that behavior is governed by a set of perceptual systems operating in an ecologically meaningful and structured world. The perceptual systems, using sensations from multiple sensory modalities to discover the amodal properties of objects and events, allow the organism to discover structure and thus the affordances of objects and events. According to J. J. Gibson (1979) :
The affordance of an object is what the infant begins by noticing .... An affordance is an invariant combination of variables, and one might guess that it is easier to perceive such an invafiant unit than it is to perceive all of the variables separately. (p. 134) E. J. Gibson (1969 Gibson ( , 1982 Gibson ( , 1984 further proposed that infants are sensitive and responsive to amodal structure right from birth and that as development progresses, through the process of perceptual differentiation, they become increasingly more capable of picking up increasingly more complex amodal invariants. According to this increasing specificity principle, initially in development, infants are sensitive to global amodal invariant relations and, as development progresses, they become more sensitive to finer, embedded aspects of amodal structure. The mechanism that makes the discovery of increasingly finer perceptual structure possible is a mutual interdependence between an actively perceiving infant and its structured environment. In other words, the infant is seen as an active seeker of perceptual structure, and the structure is seen as actively influencing the way infants seek it out. This idea of mutuality is central to a whole class of developmental theories.
Developmental Systems Theory, Epigenesis, and the Role of Limitations
According to a group of theories, all of which can be classified under the rubric of systems theories of development (Gottlieb, 1991; Johnston, 1987; Lehrman, 1970; Lerner & Kaufman, 1985; Sameroff, 1975; Schneirla, 1957) , the emergence of new structures and functions at multiple, hierarchically organized levels is the essence of development. In other words, development occurs at the cellular up through the organismic levels of organization, and one must understand all these processes and their interactions if one is to reach an ultimate understanding of development. This is the essence of Gottlieb's (1991) probabilistic epigenesis view of development according to which the developmental emergence of new structures and functions is the result of horizontal (e.g., gene-gene, cell-cell, organism-organism) and verticfl (e.g., gene-neuron, behavioral activity-nervous system) reciprocal coactions among existing constituents. For example, sensory experience can shape the ultimate structural and functional properties of the developing nervous system (Greenough & Juraska, 1979; Merzenich, Allard, & Jenkins, 1990) , and, reciprocally, the more developed and elaborate a nervous system is, the greater the behavioral capacity of the organism (Maier & Schneirla, 1964) . The results of these bidirectional/reciprocal coactions are increased complexity and the elaboration of new emergent properties. A critical feature of Gottlieb's (1991) view is that development is a process driven by the engine of coaction between two or more components and thus that one must study the relationship of the components through time to achieve an understanding of how a specific structure or function develops. As noted earlier, the direct perception view (E. J. Gibson, 1988 ; J. J. Gibson, 1979 ) also considers the mutuality between the organism and its ecology to be crucial. Although this mutuality concept is similar to Gottlieb's concept of coaction, Gottlieb's probabilistic epigenesis approach is broader in scope in that it calls for analyses to be conducted not only at the perceptual level but at all levels of structural and functional organization.
According to epigenetic systems theory, one of the most important concepts in the study of development is the concept of experience. As organisms develop, they are constantly exposed to self-generated and externally generated multisensory inputs. This constant exposure to stimulative inputs creates an experiential milieu that may or may not lay the foundation for the subsequent development of new structures and functions. Thus, one of the central questions for a developmental analysis is what role antecedent conditions play in the emergence of subsequent outcomes. By asking what role an earlier experience (e.g., in utero exposure to the maternal voice) may have on subsequent outcome (e.g., a preference for a maternal voice over a stranger's voice at birth), one is asking about the relationship between the two developmental events. In other words, an analysis of the effects of experience on developmental outcome focuses on the processes underlying the interaction of at least two components through developmental time. Turkewitz and Kenny (1982, 1985) proposed that ~n important aspect of developmental experience, particularly for perceptual development, is the timing of sensory function onset. This idea is based on the observation that the different sensory systems become functional at different times and develop at different rates in both avian and mammalian species (Gottlieb, 1971 ). Turkewitz and Kenny suggested that this differential developmental timing creates a context in which earlier developing sensory modalities develop without competition from later developing modalities. For example, in the bobwhite quail (an avian species), the auditory modality develops earlier than the visual modality, and introduction of earlier than usual visual stimulation leads to changes in the developmental trajectory of the auditory modality (Lickliter & Lewkowicz, 1995) . The most significant feature of Turkewitz and Kermy's limitations view, however, is that the immaturity of the various components of a developing system and the resulting absence of or diminished function in some sensory modalities compared to others are actually advantageous. The absence or diminished function of a given sensory modality makes it possible for another, earlier developing modality to develop without competition. As described later in this article, the general concept of limitations is a powerful idea that can be used to construct a theoretical model that can account for the development of intersensory temporal processing.
Putative Prenatal Sources of Intersensory Temporal Integration
Epigenetic systems theory considers development as a continuous process that begins at conception, and many, if not all, behavioral functions observed at birth have their antecedents in prenatal development. Because responsiveness to temporal synchrony relations emerges very early in development and may be fundamental to the development of responsiveness to the other, more complex types of intersensory temporal relations, one could ask whether such responsiveness may serve as a basis for intersensory integration in prenatal life.
The somesthetic and vestibular modalities are the first to become functional in prenatal life and are followed in order of functional emergence by the chemosensory (oral and nasal), auditory, and visual modalities (Gottlieb, 1971) . This limits the opportunities for concurrent multimodai stimulation until quite late in gestation when all but the visual modality are functional. Empirical studies show that the human fetus can respond to vibrotactile, acoustic (Kisilevsky, 1995; Lecanuet, Granier-Deferre, &Busnel, 1995) , and chemical stimulation (Schaal, Orgeur, & Rognon, 1995) by the third trimester and that the fetus also can produce its own tactile and kinesthetic stimulation as a result of spontaneous cyclic motor activity (Bekoff, 1995; Robertson & Bacher, 1995) . Thus, the prenatal environment of the third-trimester human fetus is rich in external, internal, and self-generated stimulation, and the fetus is responsive to this multimodal array. This makes it possible, for example, for a fetus to experience the consequences of its own motion (kinesthesis) in synchrony with the tactile consequences of that motion (i.e., sucking a thumb or feeling one of its limbs moving across some body surface). It should be noted, however, that when concurrent multimodal stimulation becomes possible, its effects are likely to change continually during gestation because the sensory systems mature and develop and the intrauterine environment changes as the fetus grows and the amount of amniotic fluid decreases.
In addition, the types of intersensory interactions are limited to a great extent by the nature of the fetal nervous system. Both synaptogenesis and neural differentiation occur well into the first year of life (Bourgeois, 1993; Scheibel, 1993) , and the fetal and neonatal CNS is immature, undifferentiated, and unmyelinated (Garey & Yan, 1993; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967) . Indeed, on the basis of this immature state of the fetal and neonatal CNS, some have argued that neonatal behaviors are largely governed by subcortical systems and that gradually, over several months, these systems are supplanted by cortical control systems (Bronson, 1974; Morton & Johnson, 1991; Woodruff, 1978) . Consistent with this view, results from behavioral studies show that neonates exhibit nonspecific patterns of responsiveness that generalize across sensory modalities (Kaplan, Fox, Scheuneman, & Jenkins, 1991; Lewkowicz, 1985a; Lewkowicz & Turkewitz, 1980 and that neonatal responsiveness appears to be controlled by the infant's general state of arousal and the overall amount of stimulation (Gardner & Karmel, 1995; Karmel, Gardner, & Magnano, 1991; Lewkowicz, 1991; Turkewitz, Gardner, & Lewkowicz, 1984) . As a result, prenatal stimulation most likely provides the fetus with only the basic features of the stimulus array such as intensity and/or its temporal features. In fact, it is probably these two stimulus features that provide the principal basis for prenatal intersensory integration, although no empirical information is available on the possible role of temporal synchrony in prenatal intersensory integration.
The only direct evidence showing that prenatal intersensory interactions do occur comes from studies in birds. For example, Gottlieb, Tomlinson, and Radell (1989) found that mallard embryos did not learn the maternal call (something they normally do while in the egg) if concurrent and premature visual stimulation was presented at the same time as the call but that they did if the two types of stimulation were presented in an alternating fashion. Likewise, Radell and Gottlieb (1992) found that mallard embryos failed to learn the maternal call in the presence of relatively intense concurrent vestibular stimulation but that they did learn the call when the amount of vestibular stimulation was reduced to speciesspecific levels and that this was the case even though the vestibular stimulation was presented concurrently. Lickliter and Hellewell (1992) also found detrimental effects of concurrent premature visual stimulation on learning the maternal call in bobwhite quail embryos. No studies have directly assessed the effects of concurrent, heteromodal stimulation presented at species-typical levels during prenatal development on responsiveness to the temporal relation between heteromodai inputs during postnatal development.
In sum, given that the human fetus is sensitive and responsive to stimulation in different sensory modalities, it is not difficult to imagine how the co-occurrence of stimulation in different modalities might contribute to the early appearance of postnatal responsiveness to temporally contiguous heteromodal inputs. The problem, of course, is that in avian and vertebrate species, the visual modality is not functional prior to birth, so the embryo or the fetus does not have the opportunity to experience the temporal synchrony between visual stimulation and stimulation in the other sensory modaiities. Moreover, on the basis of the fact that human infants can detect the temporal synchrony of auditory and visual stimulation very early in development, it is hard to imagine how prenatal experience could contribute to this ability. One possibility is that the prenatal experience with temporally contiguous inputs in the somesthetic, vestibular, and auditory modalities provides the developmental precursor for subsequent responsiveness to A-V temporal synchrony relations after birth.
Neural Mechanisms of Intersensory Integration
There is no doubt that the neural mechanisms required for the perception of intersensory relations are widespread throughout the animal kingdom. It is the rule rather than the exception that the various sensory pathways send their information from different subcortical areas to common and convergent areas of the cortex and that intersensory integration is the ultimate result of sensory processing (Stein & Meredith, 1993) . In the invertebrate nervous system, modality-specific afferents converge on central interneurons and efferent neurons, both of which are largely intersensory in their response properties. In the vertebrate nervous system, modality-specific afferents converge on an even greater array of subcortical and cortical multimodal regions. For example, at the brain stem level of the mammalian brain, multimodal neurons are widespread throughout the reticular activating system and provide the organism with the capacity for generalized arousal by means of any sensory route. In the midbrain, the deep laminae of the superior colliculus contain cells that respond solely to concurrent visual, auditory, and tactile input and provide the organism with the ability to orient toward meaningful multimodal events (Stein & Meredith, 1993) . In the thalamus, regions in the posterior and lateral thalamus respond to multimodal signals. At the cortical level in the primate brain, the superior temporal, intraparietal, frontal, and prefrontal cortices all contain multimodal neurons and thus are known as "association" areas.
The mechanisms underlying the perception of multimodal information have been and continue to be a matter of considerable debate and controversy (Damasio, 1989; Edelman, 1992; Ettlinger & Wilson, 1990; Freides, 1974; Marks, 1978; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Welch & Warren, 1986) . Historically, the general assumption has been that intersensory integration in the association areas mediates the higher level cognitive, perceptual, and attentive behaviors and thus provides the observer with the "final," unified view of the word. More recently, however, this view has been challenged. Instead of viewing intersensory integration as a unidirectional flow of information from lower, sensory-specific neural sites to higher level association areas where intermodaUy integrated information is stored, some have proposed that there are no neural sites that act as the repository of uniquely intersensory information in the brain. For example, Damasio (1989) has proposed that the integration of the various aspects of perceptual experience, be they unimodal or multimodal, is dependent on the "time-locked co-activation of geographically separate sites of neural activity within sensory and motor cortices, rather than on a neural transfer and integration of different representations towards rostral integration sites" (p. 39). Likewise, Edelman (1992) has proposed a theoretical model in which the brain is organized into neuronal groups that represent assemblages of neurons distributed throughout the brain that function as a single unit. The neuronal groups receive modality-specific inputs and communicate with one another constantly by means of massive, reentrant interconnections. Different neuronal groups are formed as a developing organism interacts with the external word, and those whose functions have positive consequences are selected, strengthened, and retained for future use. The continuous reentrant intersensory interactions that occur during early development are postulated to lead, in turn, to the emergence of a set of global mappings whose main function is to integrate the elemental functions into whole, integrated patterns of behavior. Thus, according to Edelman's theory, intersensory integration is the result of massive parallel interactions between modality-specific regions. In a similar vein, Ettlinger and Wilson (1990) have proposed the notion of "leakage," according to which sensory-specific representations become available to other modalities through sensory convergence (i.e., association) areas of the brain using circuits similar to Edelman's reentrant networks. Ettlinger and Wilson explicitly rejected the notion that intersensory integration is mediated by representations in polysensory neural convergence areas. Whether this "new" view of the neural mechanisms underlying intersensory integration is correct is still very much an open question and awaits empirical confmnation.
How likely is it that similar neural mechanisms mediate intersensory perception in early development? The available evidence, although mostly indirect, suggests that this is not likely. The developing brain, which is a highly plastic organ, is the result of both constructive and destructive processes. Although until recently it was thought that brain development resulted only from the growth of new neurons, it has now become clear that destructive processes play an important part as well. Initially during development, there is an overproduction of neurons that turn out to be transient and that eventually die (Frost, 1990) . As a result, the mature organization of the brain is achieved through selective destruction of these transient neurons and their connections, in part guided by sensory input and intrinsic biological processe s . For example, Frost (1990) has shown that in the newborn hamster, retinal ganglion cells send out projections to several nonvisual brain nuclei such as the inferior colliculus (the main relay station for auditory signals) and the ventrobasal body of the thalamus (the main way station for somesthetic signals). Both of these transient connections disappear by the end of the first postnatal week. Similar types of transient connections have been shown to exist between the auditory and visual cortex in kittens (Innocenti & Clarke, 1984) . In the primate brain, transient connections apparently exist for several years after birth (Kennedy & Dehay, 1993) . Based on the existence of such transient, intersensory connections, Stein, Meredith, and Wallace (1994) suggested that from an anatomical perspective, the fetal and newborn brains of some animals are more multisensory than when they become mature. Maurer (1993) went so far as to suggest that human neonates are synesthetes and that because of this fact, they actually confuse sensations in different sensory modalities. She ascribed this state of neonatal synesthesia in part to the presence of transient intersensory connections in the neonatal brain. Tees (1994) , however, maintained that there is no evidence to suggest that these transient projections exist in human infants or that they are involved in the intersensory functions so far observed in infants. Until more direct evidence is obtained in the human fetus and infant, it will be impossible to tell whether transient connections do exist in humans during early development and whether they in some way lay the groundwork for the eventual development of stable, mature forms of intersensory organization.
Regardless of whether transient connections play a role in intersensory development, there is little doubt that experience plays an important role in the development of intersensory connections at the anatomical level. For example, Knudsen and Knudsen (1985) showed that the correction of auditory localization errors resulting from the insertion of an earplug into one ear of young barn owls was critically dependent on the visual spatial cues that were available at the same time. Furthermore, Knudsen (1985) demonstrated that the spatial tuning of the auditory and visual maps in the bimodal tectal units of the barn owl became misaligned following removal of the earplug, but as the animal's behavioral localization errors diminished, the neural maps became aligned again. Similar results have been reported by King and Carlile (1993) , who found that ferrets deprived of visual experience during early development showed abnormal topography and precision in the spatial tuning of individual acoustically tuned neurons in the superior colliculus resulting in the misalignment of the auditory and visual spatial maps.
Recently, Wallace and Stein (1997) have reported on single cell responses in the deep layer neurons of the superior colliculus in kittens between postnatal Days 3 and 135. They found that there are major developmental changes in the way these cells respond to multimodal inputs. The primary functions of 75% of these cells in the adult cat are to integrate visual, auditory, and somatosensory inputs and to provide the neural substrate for spatially directed action. A unique feature of these neurons is that their response to multimodal inputs is far greater than their response to unimodal inputs. No multimodal neurons were found during the first 10 days of postnatal life, and it was not until 12 days after birth that the first type of multisensory neurons appeared. These nascent multimodal neurons responded only to concurrent somatosensory and auditory stimulation. Not until 20 days after birth were multisensory neurons that responded to visual stimulation found. Even when multisensory neurons first began to appear, their response properties were largely immature; they exhibited weak responses to sensory stimuli and had long response latencies, large receptive fields, and poorly developed response selectivities. Moreover, when these multisensory neurons first began to appear, they did not produce the kind of response enhancement normally found in the adult consisting of much more vigorous responses to multimodal, spatially coincident inputs than to unimodal ones and of response depression to spatially disparate stimulation. It was not until 28 days after birth that some of the multisensory neurons began to integrate combinations of multimodal cues and exhibited response enhancement when these cues were spatially coincident and response depression when the cues were spatially disparate. Even at this age, however, the number of multisensory neurons responding in an adultlike fashion was still low and increased gradually during the following 2 months. Wallace and Stein's (1997) findings indicate that the neural substrate for intersensory spatial integration is immature and not fully developed in early infancy. Of course, it is not clear how these findings might apply to the human infant because there are vast differences between the kitten and the human infant in terms of both the very different ecological pressures that each species has to contend with and the structural and functional status of the sensory systems at birth in each species. Nonetheless, because evolution tends to be conservative, it is likely that some of the features of intersensory neural organization observed in the kitten have some parallels in human development, and it is probably safe to assume that the development of these neural structures follows a rather protracted course in human development.
Responsiveness to Intersensory Temporal Relations:
A Developmental Model
Although there is no longer any question that infants can perceive intersensory relations in general and temporal relations in particular, most of the research to date on infants' intersensory perceptual capabilities has been concerned with demonstrating the existence of such abilities. In the words of Smith (1991) , until now investigators have been asking the "what" question, but as is evident from the earlier review of the evidence, a sufficiently large body of empirical findings has accumulated by now that it is possible to begin to ask the "how" question. In other words, it is now possible to begin to specify the processes underlying the developmental changes in infants' responsiveness to intersensory temporal relations.
With this goal in mind, I propose a preliminary model. The model offers a taxonomy of intersensory temporal equivalence relations and proposes that different psychological processes underlie responsiveness to them. The model is based on three related premises: (a) The development of responsiveness to different kinds of intersensory temporal equivalence occurs in a sequential, hierarchical manner; (b) the development of later emerging temporal processing skills is dependent on the development of earlier emerging ones; and (c) as development progresses, infants become capable of processing increasingly more complex forms of intersensory temporal equivalence. The assumption that intersensory perception of temporal equivalence is built up over developmental time in a hierarchically dependent fashion makes this a constructivist type of model and is based on the notion that an understanding of the earliest determinants of multisensory temporal experience can best be achieved by breaking that experience up into its subcomponents.
The theoretical perspective behind the model has a good deal in common with the Gibsonian view of the development of intersensory perception in that it too considers differentiation and increasing responsiveness to greater complexity to be important. It differs from the Gibsonian view, however, in three important respects. First, whereas the Gibsonian view holds that perception is amodal right from birth, the current view does not make such an assumption. Second, the current view considers development as a system of epigenetic interactions where structural and functional limitations are seen as advantageous. Third, the current view considers the development of intersensory perception to result both from the coaction of developmental differentiation and developmental integration and from the interaction of factors that are intrinsic and extrinsic to the organism.
The model makes no a priori assumptions regarding the time of developmental emergence of responsiveness to a specific intersensory relation. Rather, it attempts to specify the conditions that lead to the emergence of a particular intersensory perceptual capacity once it is identified. Whether an infant can or cannot perceive a given intersensory relation is presumed to be due to any number of factors, including the relative immaturity of neural structures, a relative lack of developmental experience, the absence of essential unimodal processing skills, and so on. In its search for the conditions necessary for the emergence of successful intersensory integration, the current view relies on a convergent-operations approach that examines the question of intersensory perception at multiple levels of organization and across different species (Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994b; Lickiiter & Lewkowicz, 1995) .
The currently available evidence indicates that infants become sensitive to synchrony-based A-V relations by the 1st month of life, to duration/synchrony-based A-V relations sometime between the 3rd and the 6th month of life, and to rate/synchrony A-V relations by the 10th month of life. Furthermore, intersensory temporal synchrony appears to play a key role in infants' intersensory response because when it is absent, infants do not respond to duration-and rate-based intersensory relations. On the basis of this core set of facts, I propose that the developmental emergence of the ability to detect the four types of intersensory temporal relations occurs in the sequential, hierarchic fashion depicted in Figure 3 . The series of increasingly larger and overlapping pipes is meant to capture the key developmental principle that the emergence of responsiveness to a given temporal relation is dependent on the emergence of responsiveness to a prior and different intersensory temporal relation. This means that once infants become capable of responding to a given intersensory temporal relation, they can rely on it to "discover" the next and more complex one. Thus, for example, the model explicitly assumes that the discovery of duration as a temporal basis for intersensory equivalence depends on the fact that heteromodal inputs are usually temporally contiguous in their onsets and offsets and that this onset/offset synchrony makes it possible for infants to discover the durationbased relation. Only sometime later in development is duration differentiated as an independent intersensory temporal attribute, and that is when response to duration-based intersensory equivalence can be made without relying on synchrony. Finally, as can be seen in Figure 3 , the model assumes that responsiveness to complex temporal structure, such as that inherent in a rhythmic sequence, is not expected to emerge until the infant first perceptually differentiates the other three intersensory temporal relations. This last prediction is based on a number of a priori processing constraints rather than on empirical evidence because such evidence is not available at this time.
The Possible Role of the ITCW in Intersensory Temporal Integration
One basic assumption of the model is that the ITCW provides an initial basis for the integration of the audible and visible features of multimodally specified events. Specifically, if the audible and visible components of an event fall inside the ITCW they are perceived as belonging together. If, however, one of them falls outside the window, they are perceived as belonging to different events. Based on this assumption, the ITCW helps explain responsiveness to rate-based intersensory equivalence. For example, let us assume that an infant sees and hears a bouncing ball. If the ball bounces at a rate that has a longer cycle time than the infant's ITCW (i.e., if the rate at which the ball bounces is lower than 3 Hz), the infant does not have to detect the specific temporal rate of each of the components. That is, given a 350-ms wide ITCW, the infant should be able to detect the intersensory equivalence of the audible and visible components of the bouncing ball on the basis of synchrony alone. This idea is illustrated in the top part of Figure 4 , which shows in schematic form the temporal distribution of this kind of A-V event. If the ball bounces at a rate of approximately 2 Hz, the infant should perceive the audible and visible attributes of the ball as belonging together. If, however, the ball bounces at a higher rate (see the bottom part of Figure 4) , the infant may no longer be able to integrate the audible and visible attributes of the ball as a unified event on the basis of synchrony alone because each occurrence of the audible and visible components of the event falls within the same ITCW and is too close to the occurrence of the next set of audible and visible components. It is as if each discrete bounce specified by its audible and visible attributes is perceptually "smeared" from the infant's standpoint.
Because the faster bounce of the ball depicted in the bottom part of Figure 4 can no longer be processed in terms of temporal synchrony alone, other temporal attributes of the event have to be processed. Among these are the specific rate at which the audible and visible components occur and whether their rate is the same or different. The evidence already reviewed shows that infants respond to unimodal rate differences, making it more likely that their failure to respond to intersensory rate equivalence may be due to other reasons. One such reason could be that infants cannot determine the specific rate of a given event in each modality. As a result of this inability, they may not be able to determine whether the temporal rates of the audible and visible components are the same or different. Alternatively, it could be that infants, although able to detect the temporal rate of the audible and visible components, may be unable to detect their equivalence.
The model also accounts well for the results from the duration/ synchrony matching studies and for the earlier emergence of duration/synchrony-based intersensory matching. It predicts that the easiest duration/synchrony-based intersensory matches should be those involving durations that are longer than the ITCW. In the studies of intersensory matching of duration/synchrony (Lewkowicz, 1986) , I found that 6-and 8-month-old infants made intersensory matches on the basis of duration/synchrony. This was the case when infants were presented with the 400-1,600-ms and the 800-1,600-ms pair of stimuli. In contrast, I found no intersensory matching when infants were presented with the 400-800-ms pair. Figure 5 shows how the model might account for the differential effects. In the case of successful matching, the top part of Figure 5 shows that the matching may be performed on the basis of the offset of the stimuli in the two modalities. If it is assumed that the ITCW that is critical for intersensory matching begins with the offset of the short auditory and the short visual stimulus and continues for between 350 and 450 ms, these two stimuli are perceived as belonging together because they fall within the same ITCW. In contrast, the long visual stimulus is not perceived as belonging together with the short auditory stimulus because it continues outside the ITCW. Similarly, the bottom part of Figure 5 shows why matching was not possible in the case of the 4 0 0 -800-ms pair. The offsets of the short and the long visual stimuli occurred within the same ITCW in which the offset of the auditory stimulus occurred, and, as a result, the infant had no basis for distinguishing between the two visual stimuli in relation to the auditory stimulus. The important point to note here is that the onsets and offsets of the stimuli in each modality provide the critical information regarding intersensory correspondence. If that is the case, then it is likely that the onset of the three stimuli in Figure 5 also causes the start of an ITCW that runs for 350-450 ms. This ITCW does not, however, help to distinguish between the three stimuli as all three begin at the same time and do not have an offset at the end of the window.
In sum, the foundational nature of intersensory temporal synchrony and the ability of the ITCW to account for intersensory integration on the basis of temporal synchrony provide an initial basis for the sequential emergence of responsiveness to what appear to be qualitatively different multimodal temporal features of the world. The ITCW may reflect some basic underlying periodicity of the nervous system that is postulated to be the product of the continuous coaction of the nervous system and experience during the organism's prenatal and postnatal development. The periodicity appears to give rise to a variety of heretofore seemingly disparate phenomena and provides a unifying principle for understanding the developmental changes observed in infants' intersensory responsiveness to temporally distributed multimodal events.
Differential Informational Complexity
Some might argue that the elementaristic approach of breaking down the organizational structure of the temporal flow of multimodal information into its subcomponents (e.g., temporal synchrony, duration, rate, and rhythm) is not useful in explaining the psychological effects of temporal experiences (Friedman, 1990) . The current theoretical position runs counter to this view and holds that an elementaristic approach is useful, and perhaps essential, to understanding the development of intersensory temporal perception and its underlying processes. Furthermore, the current position assumes that the subcomponents of multimodal temporal experience represent different levels of informational complexity and that this is the principal reason why responsiveness to each emerges at different times in development and in the order depicted in Figure 3 .
Intersensory temporal synchrony. The basic assumptions of the model are that responsiveness to intersensory temporal synchrony emerges first in development and that its developmental primacy lays the foundation for the development of responsiveness to the other three types of intersensory temporal relations. Furthermore, the model assumes that the perception of the concurrent occurrence of two events is relatively simple both because it does not require complex processing skills and because it can be performed relatively quickly.
Duration. In contrast to the perception of intersensory temporal synchrony, the perception of duration-based intersensory equivalence requires that an infant detect the temporal extent of each heteromodal component making up a compound stimulus. It is assumed that an infant, when faced with a temporally extended multimodal event, takes longer to perceive the temporal extent of each of the components and their relation than to perceive the temporal synchrony of the heteromodal components. Developmentally, the perception of intersensory duration equivalence is hypothesized as initially depending on the concurrent occurrence of the heteromodal components of an A-V event. Eventually, however, as perceptual experience with temporally organized events increases and accumulates, the perception of duration-based intersensory equivaience becomes independent of temporal synchrony, and the heteromodal components of an A-V compound stimulus no longer have to occur at the same time to be perceived as equivalent.
Temporal rate. When a multimodal event occurs repeatedly over time, it can do so in either a regular or an irregular fashion. Martin (1972) refers to the first kind of temporal structure as concatenated (i.e., successive) and to the second as rhythmic. Although the property of temporal structure has traditionally been associated with rhythmically organized stimulus sequences, there is no reason why the concept of temporal structure cannot include concatenated sequences as well. On the one hand, a concatenated sequence represents the simplest case of a temporal pattem. On the other hand, a concatenated temporal sequence is qualitatively different from a rhythmic sequence because the former is made up of equal interelement intervals whereas the latter is not. As a result, a concatenated sequence is mainly characterized by local (adjacent) dependencies that do not lead to the formation of a holistic, hierarchically organized temporal structure. The absence of a hierarchically organized temporal structure places lower processing demands on the infant. Figure 6 shows a typical multimodal concatenated sequence of stimulation. As can be seen, this kind of sequence can be quantified in terms of the number of elements occurring over a given period of time and is usually expressed in terms of a specific temporal rate. Psychologically, a given physical temporal rate is usually experienced as a certain speed of stimulation. In a formal sense, the nature of a multimodal concatenated sequence is deter- mined by at least three different properties. First, as noted above, the interelement durations of a concatenated sequence are isochronous (Fraisse, 1982b) , meaning that the elements of the sequences are separated by a single, specific duration. The faster the sequence, the shorter the interelement durations. Second, the elements of a concatenated sequence are, by definition, ordered in time. This becomes particularly important when the elements making up a concatenated sequence are different (e.g., three different people producing three different sounds in sequence). Third, under normal conditions, the heteromodal components of multimodal concatenated sequences are temporally synchronous (e.g., the lips move in synchrony with the sound whenever each person speaks). A complete understanding of infants' perceptual response to concatenated temporal sequences requires an examination of how each of these three properties contributes to the perception of multimodally specified temporal rate. Results from such an examination would provide much-needed clarification of the inconsistent findings reviewed earlier on infants' response to multimodal rate.
The fact that isochrony, temporal order, and temporal synchrony each contribute to an event's specific rate and intersensory integrity makes the perception of rate-based intersensory relations more complicated than the perception of synchrony-or duration-based relations. In addition, these three properties and the need to process them to perceive intersensory equivalence most likely require even more extended exposure to the information than that required for the perception of synchrony-and duration-based intersensory relations. That is, when faced with a multimodal concatenated sequence, an infant must determine whether the heteromodal components are temporally contiguous. If they are, the infant must perceptually extract the specific temporal rate of each heteromodal component, determine the temporal order of the elements comprising the sequence in each modality (if they are different), determine if the temporal ordering is the same in each modality, and determine if the rate of each component is the same or different. Whether the infant does this in a parallel or serial fashion is not clear at this point, but the assumption that more extended exposure is needed implies that the discovery of the temporal properties of a concatenated sequence may occur serially. As in the case of duration, temporal synchrony plays a pivotal role in the case of rate in early development because it provides infants with the first entrte into the processing of the intersensory temporal relation. As development progresses, however, the influence of temporal synchrony is presumed to wane and the child becomes capable of detecting intersensory temporal rate relations without the aid of temporal synchrony.
Rhythm. Figure 7 shows a typical rhythmic sequence. According to Martin (1972) , the unique property of this, as well as all, rhythmic sequences is that it is characterized by relative timing.
The property of relative timing first means that the interelement intervals of a rhythmic sequence are all related to each other and that this makes it possible to predict the length of the others. Second, the property of relative timing imposes on rhythmic sequences the perceptual quality of grouping, which means that a change in one interelement interval can lead to a perceptual reorganization of the entire sequence (Handel, 1989) . Finally, the property of relative timing confers on rhythmic sequences the perceptual quality of relative temporal order such that the temporal locus of a specific element of a rhythmic sequence is determined relative to the locus of all the other elements in the sequence regardless of whether they are adjacent to it or not. As a result of all of these properties, the perception of rhythm-based intersensory equivalence is more complicated than the perception of intersensory equivalence based on the other three types of intersensory temporal relations.
To perceive the intersensory equivalence of an audibly and visibly specified rhythmic structure, the current model requires that the infant first detect the intersensory onset and offset synchronies of the individual elements comprising the multimodal rhythmic sequence. Indeed, Bahrick and Lickliter (in press) recently have found that 5-month-old infants did not discriminate between two different bimodal rhythms when the A and V components making up these rhythms were out of synchrony, but that they did discriminate between these rhythms when the components were in synchrony. Synchrony itself, however, is obviously not sufficient for the perception of the other, embedded properties of a rhythmic sequence such as the durations of each of the individual elements, the durations of the interelement intervals, the temporal order of the elements, and the overall rhythmic structure resulting from the relative timing of the elements comprising the sequence. Because the rhythmic structure presents the infant with the most complex temporal information and the most complex intersensory relations, it is likely that its perception would demand more processing time than the perception of the other three types of intersensory relations.
Advantage of Model
The kind of process-oriented approach espoused by the current model offers some clear advantages over the direct, amodal perception approach. It specifies what steps might be involved in the perception of a given intersensory temporal relation and can gen- erate empirically testable hypotheses. Its advantage is that in cases of a failure to perform intersensory integration, it does not merely assume that the infant has not yet perceptually differentiated that specific amodal invariant. Rather, by specifying what processes might be involved in the perception of that particular intersensory relation, it provides the investigator with specific processes that might be deficient.
Audi t ory
Developmental Changes in the ITCW, Its Effects on Perception, and Possible Qualifications
As was shown earlier, the ITCW narrows with development from an initial width of approximately 350 ms in infancy to the ultimate width of approximately 80 ms in adulthood. It might be argued that part of the reason that infants have difficulty making rate-based intersensory matches is because the ITCW is too wide and that the eventual emergence of such a matching ability is due to the narrowing of the ITCW. This argument assumes that all rate-based matches are, in reality, synchrony-based matches. This might be the case given an ITCW of 80 ms because the maximum temporal rate that an observer would be able to match purely on the basis of synchrony would be 12.5 Hz. The problem with this explanation is that even though this rate is well within the temporal rate range that adults are able to match across modalities (Myers et al., 1981) , the ITCW is not likely to narrow this rapidly during infancy. Furthermore, it was argued earlier that responsiveness to temporal extent eventually becomes independent of temporal synchrony relations. The same must be true for rate-based relations.
The problem of detecting intersensory relations purely on the basis of temporal synchrony is particularly serious for the perception of rhythm-based intersensory equivalence. The periodicity of each individual element, and thus its local ITCW, is too short for integration to occur purely on the basis of temporal synchrony. Therefore, other processes must operate to permit the perception of rhythmic structure and the integration of that structure across modalities. This suggests that the role that temporal synchrony plays during development changes from a major and foundational one in the beginning to a supportive and secondary one later. Thus, I propose that when the ability to detect intermodal relations first emerges, it is performed solely on the basis of temporal synchrony and that all the higher level, embedded temporal relations are ignored. With development, perceptual differentiation, and experience, however, temporal synchrony enables infants to begin to notice temporal extent and permits the emergence of durationbased intersensory integration. With further development, differentiation, and experience, infants begin to acquire the capacity to detect rate-based intersensory relations, and at this point, the influence of intersensory temporal synchrony on perception begins to wane. It wanes even further when the ability to perceive intersensory rhythmic relations emerges. Although, as in the case of duration and rate, the ITCW may govern the integration of the heteromodal attributes of each individual element of the sequence, it is the more complex, higher level, organizational features that take over and begin to dominate responsiveness. In sum, the current model proposes that the ITCW lays the developmental foundation for the perception of intersensory temporal relations but that once infants perceptually master such basic relations, temporal synchrony takes on a secondary though still important role.
The developmental scenario just outlined is admittedly neat and orderly in that it considers only what happens when infants are faced with one of the intersensory temporal relations at a given age. What happens, however, when infants are faced with higher level aspects of embedded temporal structure and have not as yet developed the ability to respond to them? One possible answer to this question is suggested by the foregoing model--they simply ignore these complex, embedded features and respond only to the information in terms of its lower level temporal properties. This is similar in principle to other constructivist information-processing views of development (Cohen, Amsel, Redford, & Casasola, 1998) , which allow for the possibility that infants resort to developmentally earlier types of processing when faced with events that demand processing beyond their current capability. An alternative possible answer is that the higher level, embedded features may confuse or distract the infant from responding to the lower level features altogether. This is suggested by findings from studies in my laboratory of infants' response to the audible and visible attributes of talking faces (Lewkowicz, 1996a (Lewkowicz, , 1998 . In one study, infants were habituated to a videotaped display of a person uttering a continuous prepared text and were then given three types of test trials: an auditory test trial during which they heard another person saying something new but saw the familiar person, a visual test trial during which they saw a new person mouthing a new text but heard the familiar person uttering the familiar text, and a bimodal test trial during which they saw and heard a new person uttering a new text. Despite the fact that the temporal synchrony between the auditory and visual components was disrupted in the auditory and visual test trials, infants even as old as 8 months did not respond to this disruption. Likewise, in more recent studies (Lewkowicz, in press) involving the presentation of isolated syllables, infants as old as 6 months did not respond to one of the unimodal changes and thus to the disruption of synchrony. It seems, however, that responsiveness to temporal synchrony relations interacts with and is affected by other concurrent features of stimulation. This is suggested by the finding that when the stimulation was made more "relevant" by having the person speak in an infant-directed manner or by having the person sing, infants did respond to the changes in the unimodal test trials during which the synchrony relation was disrupted (Lewkowicz, 1996a (Lewkowicz, , 1998 . Moreover, in an experiment where responsiveness to face/voice asynchrony was tested directly (Lewkowicz, in press) , the age at which infants first responded to it was affected by concurrent featural information specifying the face and voice (i.e., whether the face and voice presented during the test trial were familiar or novel). These findings show clearly that the model put forth in this article eventually must be broadened to incorporate the effects of other nontemporal, modalityspecific factors.
Relationship Between the Model and the Epigenetic Systems/Limitations View
Rather than viewing the developing infant as an immature organism, the current model sees the infant as developmentally adapted (Oppenheim, 1981) despite inherent limitations that play a continuing role throughout development. For example, the fact that a young infant's sensory/perceptual capacities are rather primitive is seen not as a disadvantage but as an advantage that initially makes integration of auditory and visual information in terms of their synchronous occurrence in time (and space) possible. As noted earlier, the processing of intersensory temporal synchrony does not require any sophisticated perceptual mechanisms. Nonetheless, it enables infants to discover the basic properties of the world. In other words, this limited ability makes it possible to begin to organize and integrate the temporal multimodal world in a relatively simple and straightforward way without having to determine whether inputs in different modalities are related in more complex ways. The principles of developmental adaptations, timing, and limitations make it possible to understand why responsiveness to the various types of intersensory temporal relations emerges in the order proposed.
Needless to say, in the long run, synchrony-based integration is not sufficient for the perception and construction of a world of unified objects and events because the environment is rich in temporal structure and in much more complex information (J. J. Gibson, 1966 Gibson, , 1979 . Given the bidirectional/reciprocal nature of the epigenetic process of development and the importance of contextual factors in shaping behavioral outcome, the structured environment is assumed to "push" the organism and its nervous system into elaborating more complex response and processing mechanisms. These mechanisms then permit the infant to deal with greater perceptual and cognitive complexity.
Although the structured environment pushes infants to develop more sophisticated temporal response skills, the complexity of information and the developmental processing limitations at a given time in development constrain the degree of temporal complexity that infants may be able to perceive. In fact, it is these two opposing forces--(a) the push by the structured environment and (b) the inherent developmental limitations at a given point in development--that together determine the sequential, hierarchic emergence of responsiveness to the different intersensory temporal relations. For example, the interaction of these two processes means that the developmental emergence of skills needed for the perception of duration-based intersensory equivalence depends on the prior development of skills that permit the discovery and perception of intersensory temporal synchrony. The discovery of temporal extent and its relational property is not, however, sufficient for the perception of intersensory relations based on temporal rate. Thus, when the environment pushes infants to detect intersensory temporal rate and when the requisite synchrony-and durationbased intersensory perceptual skills have developed, infants must then acquire new skills that make it possible to process periodic phenomena. Finally, when faced with rhythmically organized events, infants, in addition to being able to perceive temporal synchrony, duration, and rate, must also develop the ability to perceive the intersensory equivalence of rhythmically organized events. What the current model does not consider is how spatial relations contribute to the perception of intersensory unity. As the ventriloquism effect shows, spatial factors play a very important role in integration as well. It is likely that the combination of spatial and temporal intersensory relations is a very powerful but complex one in the development of intersensory development (Lewkowicz, 1999) .
Generalizability of Model to Other Modality Pairs
Can the principles outlined above be applied to other modality pairs? For example, how might they apply to the relationship between vision and touch or to that between audition and touch during early development? It is certainly highly likely that intersensory temporal synchrony provides an important, if not the initial, basis for the integration of inputs in these modality pairs. It is also likely that temporal synchrony continues to serve a facilitative role when infants begin to differentiate the finer aspects of perceptual structure (e.g., texture) and to integrate its properties in vision and touch. In other words, it is probably important for infants to have initially temporally contiguous experiences of the same features of stimulation in both modalities before they become capable of recognizing intersensory equivalence even when inputs into the two modalities do not occur at the same time. As far as the other intersensory temporal relations such as duration, rate, and rhythm are concerned, it is not known at the present time whether and how these types of temporal relations are involved in the integration of information between vision and touch or between audition and touch.
There is virtually no information on responsiveness to temporal relations in either the vision-touch or the audition-touch pair of modalities. For the vision-touch pair, only infants' perception of shape and texture equivalence (Rose, 1994; Rose & Ruff, 1987) has been studied. For the audition-touch pair, researchers have examined infants' response to voice and touch stimulation in interaction contexts (Muir & Hains, 1993) , but no researcher has examined infants' response to temporal relations in these two modalities. Needless to say, research on the role of temporal relations in these two modality pairs would provide both important insights and a test of the generality of the proposed model.
Future research designed to address these issues should take into account the fact that each sensory modality is to some extent specialized for the processing of different features of stimulation. For example, vision is relatively better at processing spatial than temporal information, whereas the opposite is true for audition (Kubovy, 1988; Welch & Warren, 1986) . Moreover, different sensory modalities are specialized for processing different aspects of a given feature. For example, vision is better than touch in processing the spatial density of texture, but touch is better than vision in processing the roughness of a surface (Lederman et al., 1986) . Consequently, when studying responsiveness to a given sensory dimension, the appropriateness of the modality must be taken into account while conducting studies of intersensory integration (Welch & Warren, 1986 ). Also, it should be remembered that even though the temporal structure of the perceptual array is a fundamental part of our experience, the different modalities respond somewhat differently to such structure, and, thus, it is important to find out how the different modalities use such structure to integrate the information despite sensory specialization. At the same time, of course, there is no doubt that we are capable of overcoming the various specializations of the different sensory modalities and can integrate information across modalities. This suggests that the most reasonable conceptual approach in investigating intersensory integration is one that views intersensory interactions as being the product of specialization and intersensory integration processes working together.
Relationship of Model to Other Contemporary Theoretical Views
The proposed model is consistent with other theoretical views that assign a foundational role for intersensory temporal synchrony in the development of not only intersensory perceptual organization but also general perception and action systems. For example, temporal synchrony has privileged status in Edelman's (1992) theory of neuronal group selection and is considered to lay the foundation for the development of the neural circuitry underlying all behavior. Likewise, Thelen and Smith (1994) considered temporal synchrony to have privileged status. Their dynamic systems theory of development builds on the principles of Edelman's theory and applies them to the development of perception, cognition, and action in human infants. With specific reference to the multisensory character of the world, Thelen and Smith pointed out that "The experience of any set of objects or events is nearly always multimodal" and that "If the responses to perceptual information of many types are to hang together, then information reaching the different collections of neuronal groups must be correlated." On the basis of this observation, Thelen and Smith then stated the fundamental tenet of their theory: "We believe, with Edelman, that this correlation is the primary link between the mind and the world" (p. 149). To illustrate how intersensory associations provide the foundations for the process of perceptual categorization of a given object and event, they presented the example of a person eating an apple. As the person eats the apple, he or she concurrently experiences sensations in the haptic and olfactory or taste modalities, and this, in turn, leads to similar neural representations in the neuronal groups responsive to the sensations in each modality. The intersensory associations are strengthened and selected because of their perfect temporal association, because of the processes of neural reentry, and because of the vast neural interconnectivity leading to coherent patterns of firing across different sensory modalities. As a result, the person eating the apple acquires a long-lasting, dynamic association in memory of eating an apple. Thelen and Smith pointed out that the neural connections between the different senses already exist at birth and thus proposed the idea that intersensory integration may be the primitive state and that intersensory linkages do not have to be built. Furthermore, they proposed on the basis of Edelman's principle of selection that the infant's "developmental task may not be to construct, but to select from all the possible multimodal associations those that represent persistent real-life correlations of perception and action in the world" (p. 191) .
If the idea that sensory integration is the primitive is accepted at face value and if sensory integration drives development and the infant selects from all possible multimodal associations those that represent persistent real-life correlations of perception and action, this does not require that the infant come into the world capable of detecting all classes of intersensory equivalence. As was argued earlier, some types of intersensory relations are more complex and embedded than others, and, as a result, not all intersensory relations are equally obvious to direct perceptual experience, particularly in an immature organism. Indeed, the current model proposes that some intersensory relations must be experienced, perceptually differentiated, and learned before they can be used for meaningful interaction with the world. Furthermore, sensitivity to the timelocked correlation of multimodal information may be sufficient for the perceptual categorization of some aspects of the multimodal world (e.g., intensity), but it is not sufficient for the categorization of other aspects. For example, infants do not associate certain morality-specific attributes of objects and events (e.g., color, shape, pitch) until quite late in infancy (Bahrick, 1994) even though these types of attributes are experienced in a time-locked fashion from the beginning. Furthermore, the time-locked correlation of multimodal information is not sufficient for perceptual categorization in some cases because of sensory salience hierarchies. Thus, when the concurrent attributes in different sensory modalities do not elicit attention equally well, infants may either (a) not attend to their time-locked relationship and instead respond to the information in one modality only or (b) respond to the information in one modality more than to the information in the other modality (Lewkowicz, 1988a (Lewkowicz, , 1988b (Lewkowicz, , 1992b . In other words, information in one modality can sometimes block the detection of the intersensory relation even though the heteromodal inputs are time-locked. Thelen and Smith's (1994) notion that intersensory integration drives perceptual and cognitive development is also problematic in that it both fails to capture the full gamut of intersensory perceptual functioning during early development and endows the infant with a degree of perceptual power that may not be there. Thelen and Smith give the impression that intersensory integrative skills are in place from the very beginning of life. Although the overall assumption of the current model agrees with Thelen and Smith's view that infants possess some intersensory integration abilities, it differs in its central assumption that different types of intersensory integration abilities emerge at different times in development. Consistent with dynamical systems theory, however, the current model assumes that the emergence of skills for the perception of different types of temporal intersensory relations is based on experience and that the infant's discovery of the various intersensory temporal relations is to a large extent dependent on the specific context within which the infant has to process the information. In terms of the current model, the idea of context is embodied in the notion of the environmental push discussed earlier. Indeed, Thelen and Smith provide an excellent example of the importance of such an experience-based, context-dependent process. Infants who are crawlers appear to possess knowledge about depth in that they avoid it on the visual cliff. At the same time, they do not avoid steep slopes when allowed to traverse them; they plunge headfirst down steep slopes as if they do not understand the consequences of heights and of falling down the slope. Over time, crawlers learn the properties of slopes and no longer attempt to crawl down steep ones. What is interesting about this developmental d(calage is that the knowledge and understanding of slopes acquired during crawling does not generalize to walking: When these same infants begin to walk, they have to learn the properties of slopes all over again. Thelen and Smith suggest that this is evidence against domain-general knowledge structures and is instead evidence that infants' actions and knowledge are selected dynamically from the context in which they find themselves. In fact, in dynamical systems theory, the role of context is central because it is the immediate here and now that is seen as setting the stage for all behavior and that incorporates the organism's past developmental history. If that is the case, then the fact that 3-month-old infants do not exhibit evidence of duration/ synchrony-based intersensory matches but 6-month-old ones do suggests that something inherent in the infants and not the experimental task makes them respond differently. Whereas the experimental context is the same for both age groups, their developmental history is different.
Conclusions
Theoretical views on the development of intersensory perceptual functions have ranged from those of Piaget (1952) and Lefford (1963, 1967) that the senses become gradually integrated in development to those of H. Werner (1973), Bower (1974) , E. J. Gibson (1969) , and Thelen and Smith (1994) that the senses are integrated and unified from birth. On the basis of the evidence reviewed in this article and the general body of research on the development of intersensory functions (Lewkowicz & Lickliter, 1994a) , the current consensus is that intersensory perceptual abilities are present early in human development. Furthermore, the general notion that the infant's world and perceptual experience are largely, if not totally, multimodal in nature is undeniable. What has been lacking until recently in the vast majority of studies of perceptual development has been an acknowledgement of the pervasive role played by the multimodal character of perceptual experience in everyday perception. The danger of this is that scientists may have misrepresented the infant's true perceptual capacities.
Although most major theories of perceptual and cognitive development acknowledge the importance of intersensory perceptual functions, they do not provide specific details about the possible processes that may underlie the development of intersensory perceptual skills in early development. For example, E. J. Gibson's theory proposes that perceptual differentiation makes it possible for infants to pick up increasingly more complex amodal invariants and thus provides a theoretical framework for the study of the development of intersensory perception. It does not, however, specify precisely what processes enable infants to perceive increasingly more complex intersensory relations. The model proposed in this article attempts to partly address this shortcoming. It does so by first positing that the emergence of responsiveness to four fundamental intersensory temporal relations proceeds in a sequential, hierarchical fashion. It then offers a process-oriented approach to explain the sequential, hierarchical development of the perception of intersensory temporal equivalence relations. This approach capitalizes on the general principles of epigenetic systems theory, developmental limitations, and the differential complexity of the four types of intersensory temporal relations. Being situated in an epigenetic systems theoretical framework with its reliance on the concept of coaction and developmental limitations, the model is able to generate empirically testable hypotheses. These hypotheses can address such issues as the contribution of early experience to the subsequent emergence of intersensory temporal perceptual capacities, the role of sensory limitations on responsiveness, and the role of information complexity and processing constraints. The model's comparative, convergent operations approach also calls for studies to be carded out in different species at different points in development to provide insights into both similarities and differences in processes underlying the development of intersensory perceptual skills.
